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EXPLAINING CHINA’S LEGAL 
FLEXIBILITY: HISTORY AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL IMPERATIVE 
Justin W. Evans* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
China’s legal system appears to harbor a major tension, or 
even a paradox.  Certainty in law facilitates economic progress, 
which most observers agree the Communist Party requires to 
maintain its power—yet the Party has opted for a flexible legal 
system that often impedes predictability.  Prior studies explain 
China’s legal system as a product of certain constraints and as an 
expedient that allows for policy adjustments.  These factors 
undoubtedly are at work but do not fully explain the rationale for a 
legal design seemingly at odds with the Party’s economic goals.  To 
obtain a fuller view, it is necessary to consult the historical 
circumstances in which the designers of China’s legal system were 
embedded.  This Paper argues that the Party’s reformers achieved 
a percipient historical insight: the Party would require an ongoing 
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship to survive 
after Mao. Moreover, the reformers understood this competency to 
embody not only the substance of policy, but also, crucially, the 
Party’s institutional stewardship.  Of its many advantages, flexible 
law reinforces the Party’s dominance in institutional 
entrepreneurship, enabling the Party to impede rival entrepreneurs 
without disrupting the broader economic frameworks in place.  
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2018), and thank the Hurst Seminar participants for their detailed feedback: 
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and Deepa Varadarajan. Larry DiMatteo’s feedback was particularly extensive 
and insightful, and I am grateful to have had his guidance. I am indebted to Chris 
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their love and support. Any errors are mine. 
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Institutions with strategic functions emerge and viewed thusly, the 
economic tradeoffs inherent in China’s flexible laws are not the 
paradox that they seem.  The Paper briefly considers the 
implications of this historical context for multinationals’ strategies 
in China and for states’ strategic uses of flexibility in international 
legal institutions. 
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Even before seeking the common good, the first objective of power is to 
continue to exist . . . 
 — Li Ma1 
 
[I]t is not the most intellectual of the species that survives; it is not the 
strongest that survives; but the species that survives is the one that is able 
best to adapt and adjust to the changing environment in which it finds 
itself. 
 — Leon C. Megginson2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Legal predictability facilitates economic growth by enabling 
businesspeople to act confidently and efficiently.3  Western models 
present legal predictability as a critical support for civil society.  
Conversely, Western perspectives typically hold only negative 
views toward flexible legal institutions—those whose meanings and 
applications are substantially open to question, such that regulated 
parties cannot easily predict the legal treatment of their actions.4  
                                                            
1 Li Ma, A Comparison of the Legitimacy of Power Between Confucianist 
and Legalist Philosophies, 10 ASIAN PHIL. 49, 50 (2000). 
2 Leon C. Megginson, Lessons from Europe for American Business, 44 
S.W. SOC. SCI. Q. 3, 4 (1963) (summarizing Darwin’s Origin of Species). 
3 See Justin W. Evans & Anthony L. Gabel, Legal Competitive 
Advantage and Legal Entrepreneurship: A Preliminary International Framework, 
39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 333, 349–56 (2014) (noting also, inter alia, that 
observers have long searched for the optimal balance between legal certainty and 
predictability on one hand, and legal flexibility and adaptability on the other). 
4 Legal flexibilities, then, are the features of a legal system that impose 
uncertainty on regulated parties as to the permissibility of their contemplated 
actions. See id. at 367–88 (noting that legal flexibility exists in degrees and 
discussing flexibility as the features of law that complicate one’s ability to predict 
consistently and accurately the legal ramifications of one’s actions); id. at 382–88 
(observing that while some degree of flexibility exists in every legal system in the 
world, those that promote relatively high degrees of predictability can be labeled 
“high rule of law” jurisdictions, whereas those that entail relatively substantial 
degrees of flexibility and uncertainty are “low rule of law” jurisdictions). Other 
works characterize the broader but related concept of “institutional flexibility” as 
a mechanism by which states can change rules, and this sense of the term is 
inherent in the one adopted here. See, e.g., Lewis S. Davis, Institutional Flexibility 
and Economic Growth, 38 J. COMP. ECON. 306, 307 (2010) (defining institutional 
flexibility as “the propensity to develop new economic institutions in response to 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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Flexible legal regimes impose relatively high degrees of uncertainty 
on regulated parties, and hence tend to raise the transaction costs and 
risks of doing business.5  On average then, the more flexible a 
country’s law, the less efficiently its markets operate.6 
 For these reasons, the legal system of the People’s Republic 
of China (“PRC”) presents a major tension, or even a paradox.7  To 
begin, most Western observers do not ordinarily associate formal 
law (in its Western sense, anyway) with authoritarian societies, for 
the obvious reason that legal rules must prevail over the whims of 
political authorities in order for law to be reasonably predictable—
and such an arrangement is inherently at odds with authoritarianism.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or the “Party”) 
chose to construct a formal legal system beginning in the late 1970s.  
Most observers have accepted that in order for China to achieve 
major economic progress, it would have to attract foreign 
investment and protect incentives for economic activity, and hence, 
formal law assumed a heightened stature in post-Mao China.  Still, 
the tension between authoritarian rule and formal legality pervades 
the PRC business environment.8 
                                                            
changing economic conditions”); Christopher Marcoux, Institutional Flexibility 
in the Design of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 26 CONFLICT MGMT. & 
PEACE SCI. 209, 211 (2009) (defining institutional flexibility as “various formal 
and informal mechanisms by which states can change the terms of their 
cooperation” with one another); see also Part III.A (discussing the types of legal 
flexibilities). 
5 See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 349–56. 
6 Id.; accord LINDA YUEH, ENTERPRISING CHINA: BUSINESS, ECONOMIC 
AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 61 (2011); see also Yi Feng, Political Freedom, 
Political Instability, and Policy Uncertainty: A Study of Political Institutions and 
Private Investment in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 271 (2001) 
(finding, inter alia, that policy uncertainties adversely affect private investment 
in a country). 
7 See, e.g., Peter Howard Corne, Creation and Application of Law in the 
PRC, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 375 (2002) (noting the “contradiction” between the 
economic benefits of certainty and the political benefits of flexibility in the law). 
8 Gil Lan, American Legal Realism Goes to China: The China Puzzle 
and Law Reform, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 368 (2014) (arguing that China’s informal 
institutional arrangements have sometimes yielded sufficient certainty for 
economic actors, such that “[t]he picture that emerges from China is not a 
simplistic dichotomy of having formal law or not”).  
5
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Stranger than the existence of the PRC’s formal law is its 
considerable flexibility.  As noted above, China must experience 
satisfactory economic growth in order for the CCP to maintain social 
stability and, in turn, its political monopoly.9  Given the importance 
of economic growth to the CCP’s own welfare and the support that 
predictable legal rules lend to economic performance, one might 
suspect that the CCP would find appealing the sort of stable and 
predictable legal regimes associated with Western economies.  Yet 
the PRC possesses one of the most flexible legal systems among the 
world’s major economies.  China is not the only country noted for 
its legal flexibility—but some countries marked by flexible law can 
do no differently.10 In contrast, the CCP has embraced legal 
flexibility,11 despite the stultifying economic consequences that 
accompany institutional uncertainty.12 
 What can account for this choice?  Why is the PRC’s legal 
system so flexible when economic success is so important to its 
creators?  Scholarly explanations have varied over time.  Some 
drivers of flexible law are not a choice, but a product of the CCP’s 
constraints.  For instance, human language is inherently 
indeterminate, such that it is impossible to remove all ambiguity 
from law.13  And sometimes the language of a law is made flexible 
or ambiguous to attract the requisite support needed for passage in 
the legislative process.14  Others factors, however, reflect a choice: 
                                                            
9 See infra Part III.C (discussing how the CCP’s legitimacy is now more 
reliant upon economic factors than on ideology).  
10 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 385–86. 
11 See infra Part III.A. This is not to say that PRC law is infinitely 
flexible; some measure of certainty and clarity exist. There are occasions when 
the CCP rationally limits its own flexibility. E.g., Lan, supra note 8, at 401–02 
(discussing banking regulations designed to promote certainty against state 
expropriation as an example). Padgett and Answell argue that “[a]mbiguity and 
heterogeneity, not planning and self-interest, are the raw materials of which 
powerful states and persons are constructed.” John Padgett & Christopher 
Answell, Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434, 98 AM. J. SOC. 
1259, 1259 (1993). This Paper agrees that ambiguity is useful in building a strong 
state, but urges that planning and self-interest can also be coordinated with the 
state’s use of ambiguity. 
12 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 389–90. 
13 See, e.g., Lan, supra note 8, at 418–19. 
14 Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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flexible law conserves the “maneuverability” the CCP must have in 
order to respond to rapidly developing social and economic 
circumstances.15  This explanation is often framed in terms of 
China’s status as a developing economy.16 
 This Paper integrates these views into its own account of 
PRC legal flexibility.  But these prior explanations do not tell the 
whole story.  A focused examination of history has not been brought 
to bear on this topic, nor has institutional theory.  History and 
institutionalism reveal another fundamental explanation for why the 
PRC’s law is so flexible.  Flexibility was a strategic imperative for 
the CCP’s reformers because they had achieved a critical historical 
insight that their predecessors lacked.  While China’s prior rulers 
had failed due to many complex factors, chief among these was their 
ineffectiveness as institutional entrepreneurs.17  The reformers were 
determined not to commit the same error.  The CCP would need to 
remain entrepreneurial with respect to the substance of policy 
(which it had long been doing), but a further step was needed.  The 
CCP’s legal institutions would have to permit the existence of 
potential competitors for power—that is, other institutional 
entrepreneurs—while disallowing these actors from eclipsing the 
Party’s influence.  And this would have to be accomplished without 
major disruptions to China’s nascent market institutions or to the 
CCP’s own legitimacy. 
This logic, however, spawned its own dilemma.  A formal 
legal system would be required to attract the foreign investment 
necessary to finance a state strong enough to reclaim China’s 
security in a menacing global environment.  Yet China’s own 
history suggested that an entrenched formal law would either 
constrain the CCP’s ability to rule (if the Party itself were to actually 
                                                            
15 Corne, supra note 7, at 375. 
16 Hence, this explanation often implies that the PRC’s legal flexibilities 
will invariably dissipate as the country’s economy progresses, until such time that 
the PRC legal system, like those of the West, is highly predictable. This Paper 
will argue, however, that there are limits to just how certain and predictable—
how entrenched—the CCP can allow law to become. See infra Part III.  
17 See infra Part III; see also JOSEPH FEWSMITH, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS 
OF POLITICAL REFORM IN CHINA 9–10 (2013) (noting that “institutional creation 
is often glossed over” in the literature). Recent scholarship examines institutional 
creation in authoritarian contexts. Id. 
7
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observe the law), or would force the CCP regularly to disregard the 
law in maintaining control over society (in which case the Party 
would have enacted an institution destined to eviscerate its own 
legitimacy).  Of course, neither such scenario would maximize the 
Party’s utility.  And in either event, the mere existence of formal 
legal institutions would enable rival institutional entrepreneurs who 
might seek to bend the law to their interests at the expense of the 
CCP’s control.  This very real threat was heightened considerably 
as economic reforms legitimized private wealth—and with it, the 
new sources of influence that non-Party actors would wield as a 
function of their wealth.18 
The resolution to this dilemma was a system of formal law—
but one that is highly flexible.  Indeed, legal flexibility is the 
linchpin of the CCP’s post-Mao survival strategy.  Of the many 
benefits of flexibility for the CCP, the most significant is that, in 
contrast to China’s past rulers, each generation of authorities must 
now actively manage the PRC’s institutions continuously and 
strategically, in form as well as in substance—to shape China’s 
institutions on the Party’s terms, despite the vast array of potential 
institutional rivals that inevitably arise in the presence of formal law.  
The CCP’s corresponding economic goal is thus seen not as 
economic growth per se, but rather, as growth commensurate with 
the Party’s ongoing rule.19 
What emerges, then, are institutions with important strategic 
functions.  More generally, flexible legal institutions can represent 
critical strategic assets for authoritarian political incumbents 
attempting to survive modern global pressures.20  Yet this holds as 
well for multinational companies (“MNCs”) operating in lower rule 
of law jurisdictions.21  While flexible law is perceived as an 
institution from society’s perspective, it can function as a resource 
for the state and, in different ways, for the adroit MNC.  How such 
                                                            
18 See infra Part III. 
19 See infra Parts III, V. 
20 See infra Parts II–III; see also DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. 
ROBINSON, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 40–41 
(2009) (explaining that globalization can encourage democratization, and thereby 
pressure authoritarians). 
21 See infra Part V.  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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legal institutions come to exist is the principal focus of this Paper.  
Legal flexibilities are sometimes deployed strategically as a means 
to foster the political survival of their creators.  This is what has 
occurred in the PRC.  Using a historical event sequencing 
methodology, this Paper interprets the PRC’s legal flexibility as one 
of the CCP’s most crucial institutional efforts at self-preservation.22 
The PRC makes an excellent case study for this international 
phenomenon of the strategic uses of legal flexibility.  This is because 
the CCP’s survival turns upon its adeptness in directing and 
responding to the evolution of Chinese society by using, among 
other mechanisms, the country’s legal system.  For all of the 
critiques that China’s legal institutions inspire from the West—often 
for goals or measured by standards that they were never intended to 
embody23—the PRC’s legal order can supply some measure of 
security and predictability while also providing a fertile ground for 
the entrepreneurial lawyers who guide MNCs’ legal strategies.24 
This Paper offers a Western interpretation25 of China’s legal 
environment as ordered by a blending of logics,26 some unique to 
                                                            
22 See infra Part III. Party control of the military is its other most crucial 
institutional support. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: 
AN INTRODUCTION 238–62 (7th ed. 2002). 
23 Scholars note the futility of imposing Western assumptions on China. 
See, e.g., Larry Catá Backer, Party, People, Government and State: On 
Constitutional Values and the Legitimacy of the Chinese State-Party Rule of Law 
System, 30 B.U. INT’L L.J. 331, 339 (2012); PHILIP C.C. HUANG, CHINESE CIVIL 
JUSTICE, PAST AND PRESENT xi–xviii (2010); PHILIP RICHARDSON, ECONOMIC 
CHANGE IN CHINA, C. 1800-1950, at 2–3 (1999). 
24 See infra Part V. 
25 Taisu Zhang, Beyond Methodological Eurocentrism: Comparing the 
Chinese and European Legal Traditions, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 195, 206 (2016) 
(urging that comparisons of legal systems, and studies of one legal system by 
scholars who inhabit dissimilar jurisdictions, “should be performed with care, and 
preferably with some sense of methodological self-awareness.”). 
26 See infra Part III; Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional 
Logics and the Historical Contingency of Power in Organizations: Executive 
Succession in the Higher Education Publishing Industry, 1958–1990, 105 AM. J. 
SOC. 801, 804 (1999) (stating that institutional logics are “the socially 
constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, 
and rules by which individuals . . . provide meaning to their social reality”); 
accord W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: IDEAS 
INTERESTS, AND IDENTITIES 90 (4th ed. 2013). 
9
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China and others more transcendent in nature.  The PRC’s legal 
apparatus, like any nation’s,27 is a product of both these universal 
notions and the conditions unique to its elites.28  This Paper 
contributes to our understanding of the PRC in its own right, but 
there is an added benefit to the institutional approach: MNCs can 
apply the lessons of history to their operations in the PRC.  By 
understanding how the PRC’s legal context came to exist,29 Western 
enterprises will be better positioned to integrate Chinese law into 
their strategic decision-making processes.30  In addition, this study 
suggests certain similarities relating to flexibilities in international 
legal institutions.31  The Paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach 
to these topics, drawing from law, history, and business.32  In doing 
so, the Paper contributes to law and strategy (“LAS”), a growing 
research stream within the broader business law scholarship that 
seeks to understand how legal competencies and resources should 
                                                            
27 For instance, homogenous transnational elements and unique domestic 
factors both shape emergent constitutional orders. Kevin L. Cope, The Intermestic 
Constitution: Lessons from the World’s Newest Nation, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 667 
(2012). 
28 Lan, supra note 8, at 386 (noting that the law’s designers “will 
undoubtedly be informed by their own local, cultural understandings”); see also 
id. at 390 (noting that a “context-sensitive approach is important in 
understanding” PRC law). 
29 See infra Parts II–III; see Klaus E. Meyer & Mike W. Peng, 
Theoretical Foundations of Emerging Economy Business Research, 47 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUD. 3, 8 (2016) (noting that context remains important in international 
business because the legal convergence that some scholars have predicted appears 
illusive); accord Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 347; Joan Enric Ricart et al., 
New Frontiers in International Strategy, 35 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 175, 178 (2004) 
(contending that the fundamental question in international strategy is “why do 
countries differ?”); Patrick Regnér & Jesper Edman, MNE Institutional 
Advantage: How Subunits Shape, Transpose and Evade Host Country 
Institutions, 45 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 275, 276–77 (2014) (noting that “context has 
a direct influence on the strategies of MNEs”). 
30 See infra Part V; Geoffrey Jones & Tarun Khanna, Bringing History 
(Back) Into International Business, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 453 (2006). 
31 See infra Part IV. 
32 Robert C. Bird, Special Report: Legal Scholarship in Business 
Schools, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 9, 11–12 (2016) (noting that law is inherently 
interdisciplinary). 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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inform business strategy.33  The Paper expands the LAS analysis to 
show one means by which governments can approach law 
strategically, and proposes future research on the implications of 
China’s historical context for the MNC’s strategic approach to 
China’s legal uncertainties.  The Paper does not normatively endorse 
the PRC’s political structure.  Rather, it suggests that when Western 
attorneys and businesspeople ascribe only negative potential to the 
PRC’s legal flexibilities, their belief is self-defeating.34  Astute 
actors can harness such flexibilities to their own benefit.35 
Scholars’ assumptions have inspired numerous debates over 
the role of law in Chinese society.36  The key assumption in this 
analysis is that the CCP’s most basic priority is its own survival as 
a political monopoly.37  The CCP is thus assumed to act for its own 
interests and its monopoly is taken as non-negotiable.38  The benefits 
accruing to monopolists are considerable,39 and thus Party members 
are generally incentivized (albeit imperfectly) to act in furtherance 
                                                            
33 Robert C. Bird, The Many Futures of Legal Strategy, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 
575, 575 (2010); see also infra Part V. 
34 See Lan, supra note 8, at 369 (illustrating that observers might 
misunderstand an unfamiliar legal system on account of subtle contextual factors); 
see infra Part V (noting that, similarly, Western firms should not discount the 
potential strategic value of China’s flexible legal system simply because it 
deviates from Western norms). 
35 See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3. 
36 JUNE TEUFEL DREYER, CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM: MODERNIZATION 
AND TRADITION 10 (9th ed. 2014). 
37 Many others invoke this assumption as well. See, e.g., Stanley 
Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 77 (2006). 
38 This precept has been codified: China is “under the leadership of the 
Communist Party.” XIANFA pmbl. (1982) (P.R.C.). For economists, “the real 
question is whether [legal markets] are efficient.” PATRICK A. MCNUTT, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAW 17 (2010). This Paper is less concerned with the 
efficiency of China’s legal institutions (clearly, more efficient alternatives could 
be implemented) and instead focuses on their effectiveness, as measured by the 
goals of those who designed them. See infra Part III. 
39 See, e.g., ANDREW G. WALDER, CHINA UNDER MAO: A REVOLUTION 
DERAILED 118 (2015); Bruce J. Dickson, Dilemmas of Party Adaptation: The 
CCP’s Strategies for Survival, in CHINESE POLITICS 22 (Peter Hays Gries & 
Stanley Rosen eds., 2010). 
11
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of their monopoly. Such acts include the institutional maintenance 
of the Party-state.40 
Part II discusses the theoretical lens of institutional theory and 
the analytical method of historical event sequencing that will be 
used to assess why PRC law is so flexible.  Part III then applies these 
tools to argue that a system of flexible formal legality is strategically 
optimal for the CCP in its role as institutional entrepreneur.  Since 
flexibilities exist to some degree in all legal institutions,41 Part IV 
considers the circumstances under which the implications gleaned 
from China can be applied to international legal institutions. Part V 
concludes the Paper and argues that MNCs can better strategically 
account for the vicissitudes of the PRC’s legal flexibilities by 
viewing in context the historical reasons that these flexibilities exist 
in the first place. 
II. INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMISM AND HISTORICAL EVENT 
SEQUENCING 
This Part discusses the theoretical lens of institutional theory 
and analytical method of event sequencing to be utilized in 
answering the question of why the PRC legal system is so flexible.  
These frameworks inform the analysis in Part III, infra. 
A. Core Ideas of Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurship 
Institutional theory concerns the impact of context on human 
phenomena42 and explains how one’s embeddedness within an 
environment matters—that is, “how institutions constrain and 
structure action” and thereby “create regularities and stability.”43  
                                                            
40 PRC law is deemed to be instrumentalist. See, e.g., Yuanyuan Shen, 
Conceptions and Receptions of Legality: Understanding the Complexity of Law 
Reform in Modern China, in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 20, 37–
38 (Karen G. Turner, James V. Feinerman & R. Kent Guy eds., 2015). The 
question then becomes what value flexibility contributes to this instrumentalism. 
41 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 372–87. 
42 Marie Laure Djelic, Institutional Perspectives—Working Towards 
Coherence or Irreconcilable Diversity?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 15, 16 (2010). 
43 Id. An institution’s adaptability can also promote its stability. TERESA 
WRIGHT, PARTY AND STATE IN POST-MAO CHINA 2 (2015) [hereinafter PARTY 
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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The theory examines how “organizations better secure their 
positions and legitimacy by conforming to the rules and norms of 
the . . . environment.”44  Institutionalism thus emphasizes 
“regulatory, social, and cultural influences that promote [the] 
survival and legitimacy of an organization rather than focusing 
solely on efficiency-seeking behavior.”45 
 Institution “broadly refers to the formal rule sets . . . less 
formal shared interaction[s] . . .  and taken-for-granted assumptions 
. . . that organizations and individuals are expected to follow.”46  
Institutions are thus “‘the humanly devised constraints that structure 
human interaction’ . . . and include formal rules and laws as well as 
informal influences like cultural norms.”47  The law, then, is a formal 
institution,48 and countries are ‘configurations’ of interacting sets 
                                                            
AND STATE]. Stability “results when . . . dominant groups reproduce their power.” 
Neil Fligstein, Social Skill and the Theory of Fields, 19 SOC. THEORY 105, 109 
(2001). 
44 Garry D. Bruton et al., Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurship: 
Where Are We Now and Where Do We Need to Move In the Future?, 34 ENTRE. 
THEORY & PRAC. 421, 422 (2010). Scholars agree “that legitimacy is necessary 
for organizational continuity and success.” Tammy L. MacLean & Michael 
Benham, The Dangers of Decoupling: The Relationship Between Compliance 
Programs, Legitimacy Perceptions, and Institutionalized Misconduct, 53 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 1499, 1500 (2010). Legitimacy is “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within 
some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Id. 
(quoting Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional 
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995)). 
45 Bruton et al., supra note 44, at 422. 
46 Id.; accord Djelic, supra note 42, at 26 (noting a popular definition of 
institutions as the “rules of the game providing stability and meaning”) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted); Institution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
801 (7th ed. 1999) (defining in the legal context as “an elementary rule, principle, 
or practice”). 
47 Sheila M. Puffer et al., Entrepreneurship in Russia and China: The 
Impact of Formal Institutional Voids, 34 ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 441, 444 
(2010) (internal citation omitted). 
48 See, e.g., Friederike Welter & David Smallbone, Institutional 
Perspectives on Entrepreneurial Behavior in Challenging Environments, 49 J. 
SMALL BUS. MGMT. 107, 109 (2011); Desirée F. Pacheco et al., The Coevolution 
of Institutional Entrepreneurship: A Tale of Two Theories, 36 J. MGMT. 974, 981–
85 (2010). 
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and subsets of institutions in which the legal system is a key formal 
institution.49 
 Several variants of institutional theory exist.50 Some view 
institutions as so powerful that individuals are assumed to lack free 
will,51 while others posit that institutions are instead one of many 
factors influencing individuals’ behaviors.52  This Paper adopts the 
latter variant since “institutional theory can accommodate interest-
seeking, active organizational behavior when organizations’ 
responses to [institutions] are not assumed to be invariably passive 
and conforming across all institutional conditions.”53  Accordingly, 
formal institutions—including legal systems—can be designed 
consciously and deliberately.54  As such, rules are the most basic 
                                                            
49 Bruce Kogut, Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Social Science 
Data, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 139, 140 
(2010). Inter-institutional systems are also important to explaining changes in 
institutional logics. Patricia H. Thornton & William Ocasio, Institutional Logics, 
in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL INSTITUTIONALISM 99, 117 
(Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2008); see also infra Part III.B.4 (discussing the 
logics of the Maoists and reformers). 
50 See generally Djelic, supra note 42; Paul DiMaggio, The New 
Institutionalisms: Avenues of Collaboration, 154 J. INSTITUTIONAL & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 696 (1998); W. Richard Scott, The Adolescence of 
Institutional Theory, 32 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 493 (1987). 
51 See, e.g., John W. Meyer, Reflections on Institutional Theories of 
Organizations, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 790, 794–95 (2008) (discussing the phenomenological version 
of sociological institutionalism). 
52 Christine Oliver, Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes, 16 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 145, 146 (1991) [hereinafter Strategic Responses]; accord 
Raghu Garud et al., Institutional Entrepreneurship as Embedded Agency: An 
Introduction to the Special Issue, 28 ORG. STUD. 957, 961 (2007). 
53 Strategic Responses, supra note 52, at 146; Regnér & Edman, supra 
note 29, at 278. MNCs possess institutional agency. Xavier Martin, Institutional 
Advantage, 4 GLOBAL STRAT. J. 55, 61–66 (2014) (observing that MNCs possess 
institutional agency). “[I]nstitutional influences and firm discretion are truly 
complementary concepts.” Martin, supra, at 66. 
54 Robert E. Bedeski, The Evolution of the Modern State in China: 
Nationalist and Communist Continuities, 27 WORLD POL. 541, 543 (1975); 
Michael Byers, International Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L 
RELATIONS 612 (Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal eds., 2010). Both “rule 
makers” and “rule takers” try to influence institutions. See Wolfgang Streeck & 
Kathleen Thelen, Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Political 
14https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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component of institutions and “regulate organizational action.”55  
Rules are “shaped by constructive interpretations embedded in a 
history of language, experience, memory, and trust.”56  Still, this 
“openness in interpretation means that while institutions structure  
. . . governance and create a certain ‘bias,’ they ordinarily do not 
determine a political behavior or outcomes in detail.”57  The power 
of institutions can be attenuated by, inter alia, individuals’ 
ignorance of which rules exist, or what a rule prescribes for specific 
actors in specific situations; moreover, “[t]here may be competing 
rules and competing interpretations of rules and situations.”58  
Historical institutionalists “view institutions first and foremost as 
the political legacies of concrete historical struggles.”59  
Accordingly, institutions are seen as “distributional instruments 
laden with power implications”60 in which ambiguity is a permanent 
feature.61  Institutions thus partly represent actors’ strategic 
                                                            
Economies, in BEYOND CONTINUITY 1, 13–14 (Wolfgang Streeck & Kathleen 
Thelen eds., 2005) (detailing institutions as regimes with rules intermediating 
between rule makers and rule takers); see also Streeck & Thelen, supra, at 27 
(observing that “actors are strategic and even those not involved in the design of 
an institution will do everything in their power to interpret its rules in their own 
interest or circumvent or subvert rules that clash with their interests”). 
55 James G. March & Johan P. Olsen, Elaborating the “New 
Institutionalism”, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 3, 8 
(R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006). Rules “refer to prescriptions commonly known 
and used by a set of participants to order repetitive, interdependent relationships,” 
while prescriptions “refer to which actions (or states of the world) are required, 
prohibited, or permitted.” Elinor Ostrom, An Agenda for the Study of Institutions, 
in POLYCENTRIC GAMES AND INSTITUTIONS 89, 91–93 (M.D. McGinnis ed., 
2000). 
56 March & Olsen, supra note 55, at 8. 
57 Id. 
58 Id.; accord Scott, supra note 50, at 500–01; see also Evans & Gabel, 
supra note 3, at 371–82 (noting other sources of institutional attenuation). 
59 James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen, A Theory of Gradual Institutional 
Change, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 7–8 (James Mahoney & 
Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010); accord Elizabeth Sanders, Historical 
Institutionalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 39, 39 
(R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2008). 
60 Mahoney & Thelen, supra note 59, at 7–8. 
61 Id. at 11. 
15
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choices.62  When “institutions are capable of being understood in 
more than one way, gaps between institutionalized expectations . . . 
and strategic action must be filled,” and “[t]hese gaps allow scope 
for creative interpretation, application, and enactment[.]”63 
 To summarize—institutions are the formal and informal 
rules that an organization must observe to be deemed “legitimate,” 
and while they thereby influence organizational behaviors, rarely 
are institutions so powerful as to deprive actors of their agency.64  
This allows for the importance of entrepreneurship as both an 
expression of free will despite one’s institutional embeddedness and 
as a method or strategy for coping with institutions.  The 
entrepreneurship construct means more than the creation of new 
business ventures.65  Entrepreneurship, broadly construed, “is the 
process of creating value by bringing together a unique combination 
of resources to exploit an opportunity.”66  Entrepreneurs, then, “are 
people with vision who create new things.”67 Entrepreneurship is 
exercised in various contexts “to bring about new economic, social, 
institutional, or cultural environments,”68 such that entrepreneurs 
“create value where there was none before,” “within organizations 
and . . . in the marketplace.”69 
                                                            
62 Gregory Jackson, Actors and Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK 
OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 64–65 (2010). 
63 Id. at 78. 
64 Agency is “an actor’s ability to have some effect on the social world” 
such as “altering the rules[.]” SCOTT, supra note 26, at 94 (noting also that “[t]he 
presence of agency presumes a nondeterminant, ‘voluntaristic’ theory of action”); 
accord Julie Battilana, Agency and Institutions: The Enabling Role of Individuals’ 
Social Position, 13 ORG. 653, 657 (2006). 
65 DONALD F. KURATKO, ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THEORY, PROCESS, AND 
PRACTICE 3 (10th ed. 2014); see also Scott Shane & S. Venkataraman, The 
Promise of Entrepreneurship as a Field of Research, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 217, 
218 (2000) (discussing the focal points of the entrepreneurship domain). 
66 MICHAEL H. MORRIS ET AL., CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP & 
INNOVATION 9 (3rd ed. 2011) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). 
67 Fligstein, supra note 43, at 107. 
68 Elco van Burg & A. Georges L. Romme, Creating the Future 
Together: Toward a Framework for Research Synthesis in Entrepreneurship, 38 
ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 369, 369 (2014). 
69 MORRIS ET AL., supra note 66, at 9. 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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 Institutional entrepreneurs70 are individuals or organizations 
who create, transform, or destroy institutions.71  Hence, institutional 
entrepreneurship “refers to the ‘activities of actors . . . who leverage 
resources to create new institutions or to transform existing ones.’”72  
Institutional entrepreneurship can thus be viewed not only as an 
extension of institutional theory (with its emphasis on constraints), 
but also as an extension of entrepreneurship (with its emphasis on 
agency despite one’s constraints).73  Its products include new 
regulatory schema, organizational forms, practices, and identities.74  
One key motive for trying to change institutions is to legitimize the 
entrepreneur’s existence and activities75—a topic addressed in Part 
III with respect to the CCP’s attempt to legitimate its ongoing 
political monopoly after Mao, in part through a new legal system. 
Institutions and entrepreneurship are thus linked.76  Because 
the context in which it occurs is crucial to our understanding of 
entrepreneurship,77 this nexus of entrepreneurship and institutions is 
also linked to history.78  Historical analysis can “help us understand 
how managers and other actors may go against prevailing practices, 
                                                            
70 Pacheco et al., supra note 48, at 981. 
71 Julie Battilana et al., How Actors Change Institutions: Towards a 
Theory of Institutional Entrepreneurship, 3 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 65, 66, 72 
(2009). 
72 Cynthia Hardy & Steve Maguire, Institutional Entrepreneurship and 
Change in Fields, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONALISM 261, 261 (Royston Greenwood et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2017). 
73 See Nelson Phillips & Paul Tracey, Opportunity Recognition, 
Entrepreneurial Capabilities and Bricolage: Connecting Institutional Theory and 
Entrepreneurship, 3 STRATEGIC ORG. 313, 316–18 (2007). 
74 Hardy & Maguire, supra note 72, at 273. 
75 Lynne G. Zucker, Institutional Theories of Organization, 13 ANN. 
REV. SOC. 443, 451 (1987); accord Pacheco et al., supra note 48, at 980. 
76 José María Veciana & David Urbano, The Institutional Approach to 
Entrepreneurship Research: Introduction, 4 INT’L ENTREP. & MGMT. J. 365 
(2008). 
77 Welter & Smallbone, supra note 48, at 107. 
78 R. Daniel Wadhwani, Entrepreneurship in Historical Context: Using 
History to Develop Theory and Understand Process, in A RESEARCH AGENDA 
FOR ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND CONTEXT 65 (Friederike Welter & William B. 
Gartner eds., 2016). 
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break the rules-of-the game, or invent new ones”79—that is, how 
actors become institutional entrepreneurs.  With these connections 
in mind we now turn to the analytical methods relevant to assessing 
the flexibility of Chinese law, and the purposes and uses of that 
flexibility by the CCP. 
B. Strategy in Context and the Historical Event Sequencing 
Methodology 
The significance of entrepreneurship to our topic was noted 
above. An equally important concept is strategy80 in that the CCP 
has used flexible legal institutions at the heart of its post-Mao 
survival strategy.  These institutions, in turn, now set the context for 
MNCs’ strategies in China.81  More specifically, the PRC’s flexible 
legal institutions have enabled the CCP to maintain a competitive 
advantage in institutional entrepreneurship across time.82 
Studies should account for the historical embeddedness of 
strategy,83 but few do.84  Historical embeddedness refers to “the 
ways in which strategic processes and practices . . . are embedded in 
                                                            
79 Eero Vaara & Juha-Antti Lamberg, Taking Historical Embeddedness 
Seriously: Three Historical Approaches to Advance Strategy Process and 
Practice Research, 41 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 633, 644 (2016). 
80 Strategy in the political context refers to how actors accumulate and 
deploy power. ROBERT MACINTOSH & DONALD MACLEAN, STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT: STRATEGISTS AT WORK 13–14 (2015). Strategy in the MNC 
context concerns “how the multi-national creates value across countries[.]” 
DAVID COLLINS, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY 4 (2014). 
81 See infra Parts III, V. 
82 This Paper imports several concepts from business and argues that they 
are applicable in the PRC’s legal and political contexts.  Competitive advantage, 
for instance, is typically defined in business as the capabilities and resources that 
give a firm an advantage over its rivals and that result in higher profits. See, e.g., 
Benjamin Maury, Sustainable Competitive Advantage and Profitability 
Persistence: Sources versus Outcomes for Assessing Advantage, 84 J. BUS. RES. 
100, 101 (2018). In this paper, the CCP’s competitive advantage refers to the 
capabilities and resources that give the Party an advantage against any group that 
might compete with it for power. The flexibility of the PRC’s legal system (a 
resource) affords the CCP its competitive advantage in institutional 
entrepreneurship (a capability). 
83 See generally Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79. 
84 Id. at 636. 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol31/iss1/4
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and defined by sociohistorical environments.”85  Strategy thus 
“shapes and is shaped by its context”86 and is both enabled and 
constrained by institutions.87  Even activities not traditionally seen 
as “strategic” may come to be viewed as such in their historical 
context.88  Hence, “analysis of historical embeddedness adds to our 
understanding of the construction of organizational strategies or 
their emergence in context.”89  Vaara and Lamberg “call for specific 
applications of historical analysis” to questions of strategy.90 This 
Paper will use event sequencing to explore the issue of institutional 
entrepreneurship in the CCP’s historical context.  
The strategy of any organization—including a political 
one—is better understood in its historical context.91  History—like 
institutions—forms a crucial element of context.  Historical analysis 
“can highlight how strategic practices are enacted” and “how actors 
make use of them[.]”92  Answering why the PRC’s legal institutions 
are so flexible will allow Part III below to illuminate the strategic 
value of such institutions to the CCP, given its historical context.93  
Moreover, it is in this very context that MNCs in China today find 
themselves embedded, and thus, firms might approach the law 
strategically through a type of embedded agency94 called legal 
entrepreneurship.95  The interrelationships of these ideas and their 
overlap with this Paper’s organization are depicted in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
                                                            
85 Id. at 634. 
86 Id. at 636. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 641. 
89 Id. at 649.  
90 Id. at 650. 
91 See generally STEVEN J. KAHL ET AL., HISTORY AND STRATEGY 
(Steven J. Kahl et al., 2012). 
92 Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79, at 644. 
93 This is essential in China, where history has diffused strategy as a core 
cultural element. HONG LIU, THE CHINESE STRATEGIC MIND 135–40 (2015).  
94 Vaara & Lamberg, supra note 79, at 641–42 (“By embedded agency, 
we mean the historical and contextual influence exercised by top executives . . . 
[over] the strategies of the organization.”). 
95 See infra Part V. 
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A framework is thus needed that accounts for both 
institutions and their historical context.  Historical event sequencing 
is a methodology for examining the processes and causes of 
institutional change by taking “into account the temporal effect and 
sequencing of actions.”96  The works of Sewell, Thornton et al., and 
Nasra and Dacin elaborate the contours of this approach.  Tracking 
many tenets of institutional theory,97  William Sewell argues that 
historical events are “sequences of occurrences that result in 
transformations of structures” such that an event “becomes a 
historical event . . . when it touches off a chain of occurrences that 
durably transforms previous structures and practices.”98  Such 
changes are “clustered into relatively intense bursts,” altering social 
relations “in ways that could not be fully predicted from the gradual 
changes that may have made them possible.”99  Some temporal 
duration exists between a rupture and the resultant structural 
change.100  Historical events are significant because they “[alter] the 
nature of the causal nexus in which social interactions take place.”101 
 Sewell showed how the Bastille came to be regarded as the 
watershed moment of the French Revolution,102 utilizing a 
                                                            
96 Rasha Nasra & M. Tina Dacin, Institutional Arrangements and 
International Entrepreneurship: The State as Institutional Entrepreneur, 34 
ENTRE. THEORY & PRAC. 583, 588 (2010); see also Thornton & Ocasio, supra 
note 49, at 116–17 (defining event sequencing as “the temporal and sequential 
unfolding of unique events that dislocate, rearticulate, and transform the 
interpretation and meaning of cultural symbols and social and economic 
structures”). Related approaches also emphasize processes across time. PAUL 
PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 2–3 
(2004).   
97 See William H. Sewell, Jr., Historical Events as Transformations of 
Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille, 25 THEORY & SOC. 841, 842 
(1996). 
98 Id. at 843. 
99 Id. Still, institutions also change gradually. See Mahoney & Thelen, 
supra note 59, at 1. Historical analysis is beneficial because “gradual . . . changes 
often only ‘show up’ or ‘register’ as change if we consider a somewhat longer 
timeframe[.]” Id. at 2. 
100 Sewell, supra note 97, at 845. 
101 Id. at 843. 
102 See generally id. 
21
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narrative103 to illustrate how the actors interpreted their context,104 
how various groups worked together and why,105 and how other 
powerful interests reacted to the events.106  Event sequencing 
requires the reconstruction of events and actors’ interpretations from 
a given rupture to the resulting institutional change.107  Sewell’s 
approach is thus crucially concerned with processes.  This suggests 
that to understand why China adopted a system of flexible legality, 
we must reconstruct the historical processes that produced the legal 
system and actors’ likely interpretations of key events.108 
 Sewell also showed that institutional entrepreneurs are 
greatly aided by the possession of legitimacy.109  Victors in a 
struggle over institutions are usually those who can conflate their 
position with ‘the legitimate view.’110  Events help to shape the 
context in which they occur,111 and are also shaped by that 
context.112  Historical events often represent acts of collective 
creativity in which “new arguments [are] tried out.”113  Their effects 
must sometimes be sanctioned by the state to achieve longevity.114 
                                                            
103 Id. Historical narratives are “reconstructions, assembled within the 
virtual laboratories of [historians’] minds, of the processes that produced whatever 
structure it is we’re seeking to explain . . . [W]e ask ourselves, ‘How could this 
have happened?’” JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, THE LANDSCAPE OF HISTORY: HOW 
HISTORIANS MAP THE PAST 105 (2002).  
104 Sewell, supra note 97, at 848–49. 
105 Id. at 850. 
106 Id. at 850–51. 
107 Id. at 852. 
108 See infra Part III. Historical analysis aims to identify actors’ own 
contemporaneous interpretations. GADDIS, supra note 103, at 106–07. 
109 Sewell, supra note 97, at 853, 856–58; see also supra note 44 and 
accompanying text (defining legitimacy). 
110 Sewell, supra note 97, at 859. 
111 Id. at 856. 
112 Id. at 862–66. 
113 Id. at 867–68. 
114 Id. at 874–75. 
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 Thornton et al., examined changes in the organizational 
governance of certain industries.115 Building on Sewell,116 these 
authors “theorized [historical events] as the occurrences that 
dislocate, rearticulate, and transform structures,” the sequencing of 
which “produces more events that reinforce or erode the dominance 
of the incumbent logic.”117  The temporal and spatial ordering of 
events can help to explain why they preserve, modify, or destroy 
institutions.  A “[h]istorical sequencing of events provides the 
temporal framework to understand how structural overlap provides 
access to different institutional logics and how institutional 
entrepreneurs . . . turn [these logics] into actions that maintain 
stability or initiate change.”118  This approach recognizes the state 
as a primary actor of interest.119  Central to this work is the effect of 
contextual change on the struggle between defenders of existing 
institutions and their challengers:120 conflicts between institutional 
defenders and attackers amount to struggles between rival sets of 
institutional entrepreneurs.121  As with Sewell, legitimacy was 
central to explaining institutional change.122 
 Political historians urge that “we must . . . bring the state 
back in” because “[s]tate power matters . . . as a force for 
transforming social structures[.]”123  Building, in turn, upon 
Thornton et al., Nasra and Dacin applied historical event sequencing 
to show how a government can act as an institutional 
                                                            
115 Patricia H. Thorton et al., Institutional Logics and Institutional 
Change in Organizations: Transformation in Accounting, Architecture, and 
Publishing, in 23 RES. IN THE SOC. OF ORGS. 125 (Candace Jones & Patricia H. 
Thornton eds., 2005). 
116 Id. at 130. 
117 Id. The competing logics of the Maoists and reformers are detailed in 
Part III.B.4, infra. See also WALDER, supra note 39, at 16 (observing that 
“[p]olitical revolutions can be viewed as a contest between two organizations: the 
established state and insurgent forces”). 
118 Thorton et al., supra note 115, at 131. 
119 Id. at 128. 
120 Id. at 139, 145. 
121 Id. at 146. 
122 Id. at 148, 157. 
123 Jon Lawrence, Political History, in WRITING HISTORY: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 209, 224 (Stefan Berger et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2010) (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted). 
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entrepreneur.124  Event sequencing implies path dependence: “once 
a state or political actor proceeds along a certain path, the costs of  
. . . changing paths progressively increases.”125 Nasra and Dacin 
explain how sequenced events facilitated Dubai’s creation of a new 
legal system.126  These scholars linked resources and agency to show 
that “the state [can] simultaneously create and manage multiple 
institutional frameworks.”127  Dubai crafted new legal institutions to 
attract foreign entrepreneurs.128 
Like Nasra and Dacin’s study, the research presented here 
concerns the creation of legal institutions.129 In contrast to Dubai, 
however, foreign investors generally have engaged the PRC despite 
its legal apparatus, and not because of it.130  Significantly, “state-
business relations within [nondemocratic] contexts are highly 
contingent on the nature of the institutional environments” in 
place.131  As an institutional entrepreneur, Dubai’s chief concern 
was attracting foreign investment.  In contrast, while the CCP 
certainly desires foreign investment,132 economic development in 
China is embraced only to the extent it is perceived not to threaten 
the CCP’s political monopoly.133  Following Nasra and Dacin’s 
                                                            
124 Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584. Nasra and Dacin’s paper is a 
seminal work in entrepreneurship. Others have also characterized the PRC state 
as an institutional entrepreneur. See, e.g., John Child et al., Institutional 
Entrepreneurship in Building an Environmental Protection System of the 
People’s Republic of China, 28 ORG. STUD. 1013 (2007). 
125 Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 588. 
126 Id. at 589. 
127 Id. at 595. 
128 Id. 
129 See infra Part III. 
130 YUHUA WANG, TYING THE AUTOCRAT’S HANDS 7–8, 44–45 (2015). 
Nevertheless, PRC law can represent an asset for legal entrepreneurs. See 
generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3. 
131 Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584. 
132 See infra Part III. 
133 See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting the key assumption that 
the CCP’s top priority is the preservation of its political monopoly); see also infra 
Part III. Economic development undeniably is a top priority for the Party. 
Margaret K. Lewis, Criminal Law Pays: Penal Law’s Contribution to China’s 
Economic Development, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 371, 373–75 (2014). It is 
tempting, then, to simply conflate development with the Party’s survival. Part III, 
infra, however, suggests that a more nuanced set of boundaries is involved. This 
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approach, this Paper illustrates the nature of the CCP’s institutional 
entrepreneurship “by tracking the conditions and events that have 
enabled the creation of”134 the PRC’s flexible formal legality.135 
 In addition to event sequencing, this analysis is also 
informed by widely recognized guidelines in historical studies. Of 
course, just because one event happens before another does not 
mean that the earlier event caused the later one.136  But effective 
narrative will combine chronology with causation to show how 
certain events caused later ones, or facilitated their occurrence.137  
 John Lewis Gaddis’ historical analytical approach couples 
imagination with logic to explain today’s observable structures by 
deducing the past processes that must have produced such 
structures.138  This Paper seeks only to explain:139 the task of 
historical analysis is to explain the past, and, unlike the social 
sciences, is not to make predictions about the future.140  Hence, 
historians practice “particular generalization,”141 using theory to 
show how past processes produced present structures.142  
                                                            
argument is consistent with China’s pre-Communist experience: scholars have 
noted “the primacy of central political control over the subordinated processes of 
economic growth and cultural diversification” in earlier periods of Chinese 
history as well. JOHN KING FAIRBANK & MERLE GOLDMAN, CHINA: A NEW 
HISTORY 126–27 (2d enlarged ed. 2006). 
134 Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 595. 
135 See infra Part III. 
136 RICHARD MARIUS & MELVIN E. PAGE, A SHORT GUIDE TO WRITING 
ABOUT HISTORY 36 (9th ed. 2015). 
137 WILLIAM KELLEHER STOREY, WRITING HISTORY: A GUIDE FOR 
STUDENTS 94 (4th ed. 2013). 
138 GADDIS, supra note 103, at 39–41. This is akin to the natural sciences 
in which thought experiments substitute for laboratory experiments. Id. 
139 MARIUS & PAGE, supra note 136, at 36–37. 
140 GADDIS, supra note 103, at 56–60, 111–15. 
141 Id. at 60–63. “Historians generalize . . . but only from the knowledge 
of particular outcomes.” Id. at 66. The macro-effect resulting from innumerable 
actors is difficult to predict. Id. at 74–78. A given system can contain both linear 
and non-linear relationships, such that the system is “simple and complex at the 
same time.” Id. at 76. 
142 Id. at 60–63. “[S]ystems themselves become entangled in events,” and 
thus, consistently accurate forecasting is frustrated when variables proliferate. Id. 
at 65. 
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Explanation is the historian’s “chief priority.”143  Like lawyers, 
historians often embrace contingent, rather than categorical, 
causation in which ‘it depends’ precedes an analysis.144  Thus, while 
we might anticipate that the PRC’s flexible legal system will have 
ongoing value to the CCP and that the CCP will attempt to preserve 
this system, this Paper makes no prediction on whether it will 
succeed.145 
 Gaddis’ guidelines for establishing causation are 
noteworthy.  Since there is no precise rule for when to stop tracing 
the causes of an event, the ‘principle of diminishing relevance’ 
advises that “the greater the time that separates a cause from a 
consequence, the less relevant we presume that cause to be.”146  
More generally, “[c]auses always have contexts, and to know the 
former we must understand the latter.”147  The historical analysis 
needs “points of criticality at which stability becomes unstable”—
                                                            
143 Id. at 62. 
144 Id. at 64. 
145 See BRUCE J. DICKSON, THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA: THE CHINESE 
COMMUNIST PARTY’S STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL 1 (2016) (noting predictions of 
the Party’s downfall, and that these errantly discount the Party’s adaptability) 
[hereinafter THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA]; FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 6 (noting 
little evidence that interest groups are affecting political reform); PITMAN B. 
POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM 13–14 (2013) (noting forces promoting the 
legitimacy of formal law in China). Scholars have pointed to the negative 
tradeoffs for the Party of its approach to law. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman, 
Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 17, 27 (2009) 
[hereinafter Assessing China’s Legal Reforms]; Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn 
Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935 (2011); Suli Zhu, Paradoxes of Legal 
Development in 20th Century China from the Perspective of Modernisation, 28 
HONG KONG L.J. 429, 435–37 (1998). Still, the assumption that China will 
inevitably democratize is highly suspect. See generally Gunter Schubert, One-
Party Rule and the Question of Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Preliminary 
Thoughts on Setting Up a New Research Agenda, 17 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 191 
(2008). 
146 GADDIS, supra note 103, at 96. 
147 Id. at 97 “[W]hile context does not directly cause what happens, it 
can certainly determine consequences.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
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that is, “the point at which these processes took a distinctive, or 
abnormal, or unforeseen course.”148 
 The analysis in Part III relies mostly upon secondary 
historical sources.149  Other institutional works, including Nasra and 
Dacin, rely solely upon secondary sources.150  While history is 
central to the analysis here, the overarching purpose is to explain the 
institutional evolution of the PRC’s legal regime through the 
application of theory to what is already known to historians, and not 
to offer an original interpretation of primary historical sources as 
such.  Accordingly, the Paper takes an essentially historiographical 
approach to the sources underlying the analysis in Part III.151 
III. EXPLAINING CHINA’S LEGAL FLEXIBILITIES 
The evolution of PRC law has been tumultuous.152  The institutional 
origins of the PRC’s present legal system began nearly a century-
and-a-half before its creation, and hence, the historical 
circumstances surrounding its creation are vitally important to 
understanding the rationale for its flexible design.  Following Mao 
Zedong’s death in 1976, the CCP’s reform factions gained power,153 
                                                            
148 Id. at 98. Or, what Gaddis describes as “punctuations in some existing 
equilibrium[.]” Id. at 99–100. But see supra note 99 (discussing endogenous 
institutional change). 
149 In original works of history, primary sources are best. See, e.g., JIM 
CULLEN, ESSAYING THE PAST: HOW TO READ, WRITE, AND THINK ABOUT 
HISTORY 23–25 (3rd ed. 2013). But in wider topical treatments, secondary sources 
are more prominent. ANTHONY BRUNDAGE, GOING TO THE SOURCES: A GUIDE TO 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND WRITING 25 (5th ed. 2013).  
150 See Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 588–89. 
151 Secondary sources “provide a broader perspective,” allowing one “to 
see [events] in context.” MARY LYNN RAMPOLLA, A POCKET GUIDE TO WRITING 
IN HISTORY 11 (8th ed. 2015). And in historiographical work, one can “evaluate 
the viewpoints of two or more historians[.]” Id. at 40. 
152 For several excellent overviews, see JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: 
CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 31–55 (2008); TONY SAICH, GOVERNANCE AND 
POLITICS OF CHINA 34–107 (3rd ed. 2011); Frederick C. Teiwes, Mao Zedong in 
Power (1949-1976), in POLITICS IN CHINA 63–102 (William A. Joseph ed., 2nd 
ed. 2010).   
153 See infra Parts III.B.4, III.C. 
27
EVANS ARTICLE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/19  8:08 PM 
200 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 31:1 
and it was these ‘reformers’154 who constructed a new legal system 
during the 1980’s and 1990’s.155  The flexibility of the PRC’s legal 
system has been attributed to many factors, including its relative 
newness.156  While these factors also encouraged the PRC’s legal 
flexibility, another fundamental force was at work: PRC law is 
intended to serve several strategic purposes, simultaneously 
shaping the PRC’s broader environment and promoting the CCP’s 
political monopoly.157  Legal flexibility is a strategic asset for the 
CCP.158  Before exploring in detail why the present system was 
designed in this manner, however, we first clarify how flexibility 
permeates Chinese law. 
A. How Flexibility Defines the Modern Chinese Legal System 
Mao’s successors constructed the PRC legal system with 
their own priorities in mind. Like China’s previous rulers, the 
reformers had discovered the advantages of legal flexibility and 
                                                            
154 DREYER, supra note 36, at 113–14 (noting that “[t]hose who preferred 
to break sharply with the Maoist past are generally termed reformers”). 
155 Jerome A. Cohen, Law in Political Transitions: Lessons from East 
Asia and the Road Ahead for China, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 423, 423–24 
(2005); accord JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 705 
(1990) [hereinafter THE SEARCH]. 
156 See, e.g., Leontine D. Chuang, Comment, Investing in China’s 
Telecommunications Market: Reflections on the Rule of Law and Foreign 
Investment in China, 20 N.W. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 509, 523–24 (2000). 
157 See, e.g., Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Continuing 
Commitment to the Primacy of State Power, 159 CHINA Q. 673, 673 (1999). The 
“PRC legal system reflects the commitment of the Chinese Communist Party to 
maintaining its monopoly on political power.” Id. at 673; accord Sarah Biddulph, 
The Production of Legal Norms: A Case Study of Administrative Detention in 
China, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 217, 274 (2003) (discussing the Legislation Law 
as an example); see also supra text accompanying note 37.  
158 Nara Dillon, Governing Civil Society: Adapting Revolutionary 
Methods to Serve Post–Communist Goals, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 138, 157 
(Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011). This is distinguishable from 
other contexts in which states have used “strategic ambiguity.” See, e.g., Jeffrey 
Adam Sachs, “Native Courts” and the Limits of the Law in Colonial Sudan: 
Ambiguity as Strategy, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 973 (2013). More generally, 
some flexibility can actually promote an institution’s stability. Claus Offe, 
Designing Institutions in East European Transitions, in THE THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 199, 209 (1996). 
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were content to retain it.159  Thus, “[f]lexibility is a key element of 
the [PRC] legal system,”160 reflecting a dichotomy between the 
formal law (as stated officially) and the law in practice (as 
applied).161  PRC law retains this flexibility by design,162 
functioning largely to define the parameters within which lower-
level officials may act.163 
Peter Howard Corne’s seminal book on China’s 
administrative apparatus, Foreign Investment in China,164 stresses 
the prominence of legal flexibility. “China has opted for a legal 
system that is in essence as fluid and changeable as the economy 
and society which it is supposed to regulate . . . [L]aws are 
                                                            
159 Franz Michael, The Role of Law in Traditional, Nationalist and 
Communist China, 9 CHINA Q. 124, 143–47 (1962) (illustrating some advantages 
of flexibility); accord HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, 
WHEN, HOW 125 (1950). In contrast to the USSR, the PRC favored extreme 
fluidity in the 1960s. JOHN N. HAZARD, COMMUNISTS AND THEIR LAW 100 
(1969). The PRC’s system of administrative specification, discussed in Part III.A, 
mimics a somewhat similar imperial system. See R. Randle Edwards, The Role of 
Case Precedent in the Qing Judicial Process as Reflected in Appellate Rulings, in 
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 180, 180–81 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 
2003); PETER HOWARD CORNE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CHINA: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LEGAL SYSTEM 104 (1997). 
160 Assessing China’s Legal Reforms, supra note 145, at 28; accord 
David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Institutional Foundations for the Chinese 
Market Economy: The State, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 455, 459 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013). 
161 William C. Jones, Trying to Understand the Current Chinese Legal 
System, in UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
JEROME A. COHEN  7, 35–36 (C. Stephen Hsu ed., 2003); Evans & Gabel, supra 
note 3, at 372, 377–78. 
162 Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical 
Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 165, 172 (Sebastian 
Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011). 
163 CORNE, supra note 159. Examples of flexibility and uncertainty in 
Chinese law are cited often in Western law literature, see, e.g., Rongjie Lan, A 
False Promise of Fair Trials: A Case Study of China’s Malleable Criminal 
Procedure Law, 27 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 153 (2010); Wu Xiaofeng, Comment, 
An Analysis of Wrongful Convictions in China, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 451, 
461, 465 (2011); Mei Ning Yan, China and the Prior Consent Requirement: A 
Decade of Invasion and Counter–Invasion by Transfrontier Satellite Television, 
25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 265, 302 n.160 (2003). 
164 See generally CORNE, supra note 159. 
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intentionally made ambiguous to enable flexibility in interpretation 
and implementation.”165  Flexibility and ambiguity do not merely 
exist in the contemporary PRC legal system; they define the 
contemporary PRC legal system. 
 Flexible law is ideologically palatable in the PRC because it 
is “consistent with socialism.”166  But more than philosophy is at 
work because the CCP enjoys a nearly unlimited range of options to 
shape or respond to societal developments, and all of its actions 
plausibly can be described as consistent with the law (and therefore, 
as legitimate).167  One official summarized that “law should not be 
too specific lest it tie our hands and feet in the face of the rapidly 
changing situation.”168  The CCP’s hope is to maintain its flexibility 
without sacrificing its legitimacy or social stability.169  The resultant 
law-making process is known as administrative specification.170 
 Statutes, beginning as high as the National People’s 
Congress, pronounce policies in deliberately broad language, 
serving “to provide only a thumbnail sketch of the parameters of 
regulation.”171  Legal drafting is characterized by calculated 
vagueness and ambiguity, undefined terms, broadly worded 
discretions, omissions, principle-like pronouncements, and general 
                                                            
165 Id. at 94; accord Corne, supra note 7, at 376–78. Chinese legal 
flexibility serves to decouple China’s external goals from its internal ones. See 
infra Part III.C. Authoritarians decouple by giving the impression of public 
involvement, while “denying tangible policy authority and squelching 
independent political activity in practice.” See Dan Slater, Altering 
Authoritarianism, in EXPLAINING INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 132, 134–135 (James 
Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen eds., 2010). 
166 CORNE, supra note 159, at 93–94. 
167 Id. at 94. 
168 Gao Xi-Ching, Today's Legal Thinking and Its Economic Impact in 
China, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 113 (1989) (quoting Wang Hanbin’s 
March 7, 1985 speech). 
169 See infra Part III.C. 
170 “Administrative specification is the process by which law and 
regulations are interpreted, at one level, by State Council departments, and at 
another level, by local people’s congresses and administrative bodies which apply 
them to local reality.” CORNE, supra note 159, at 104. Otherwise stated, 
“[a]dministrative specification is the process by which principle-like laws are 
narrowed down through a succession of enactments so that they can be applied to 
local reality.” Id. at 105. 
171 Id. at 95. 
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catch-all phrases.172  Lower-level people’s congresses likewise 
enact statutes with these features. 
Once a statute is promulgated, administrative bodies such as 
the State Council—the PRC’s national executive body—create 
rules, interpretations or even informal ‘normative documents’ to 
build upon the statute in question.173  This process cascades 
downward, as each successively lower level of the state ‘specifies’ 
higher-order laws, creating more specific artifacts.174  Of course, by 
the time this cascade reaches the bottom rungs of the state, myriad 
variations appear in the laws across localities.  But this diversity is 
deemed both a natural result of specification and an affirmative 
good.175  The specification process empowers local officials to apply 
national policies to their particular circumstances—in theory, to best 
                                                            
172 Id. Others have similarly noted that PRC statutes are conspicuously 
ambiguous—to such an extent that the importance and difficulty of statutory 
interpretation are greatly heightened. See, e.g., Ji Li, The Power Logic of Justice 
in China, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 95, 110 (2017) (noting that the PRC Supreme 
People’s Court engages in statutory interpretation “frequently since most Chinese 
statutes are too vague and ambiguous to apply directly”). Still other scholars have 
discussed at length the ambiguities in particular PRC statutes. See, e.g., Deng 
Ruiping & Duan Xiaosong, Promoting Impartiality of International Commercial 
Arbitrators Through Chinese Criminal Law: Arbitration by “Perversion of Law”, 
10 BYU INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 109, 125 (2014) (discussing the 2006 
amendments to the PRC Criminal Law and noting that “the Chinese statute is 
ambiguous”); Gregory Hwa, Breaking Out of the West, Advancing into Asia: 
Cultural Considerations for Brand Management in China, 25 MARQ. SPORTS L. 
REV. 399, 399–400 (2015) (noting that recent amendments to the PRC “trademark 
statute have created substantial ambiguity as to how, and if any, safeguards 
against infringement will actually apply”); Wei Wen, How American Common 
Law Doctrines May Inform Mainland China to Achieve Certainty in Land Sale 
Contracts, 17 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 2, 17–20 (2015) (discussing ambiguities 
in PRC contract and real property laws in the context of land sales). 
173 CORNE, supra note 159, at 104–05. 
174 Id. at 93–145 (discussing flexibility in the law’s creation); id. at 189–
242 (discussing flexibility in implementation). For more on legal artifacts, see 
Luka Burazin, Can There be an Artifact Theory of Law?, 29 RATIO JURIS 385 
(2016) (characterizing laws as institutional artifacts in that they owe their 
existence to human activities and require collective intentionality). 
175 See CORNE, supra note 159, at 126, 147; accord Peter K. Yu, Piracy, 
Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the 
U.S.–China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 36–37 (2001). 
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serve the CCP’s interests in each place.176  It also encourages 
stakeholders to bargain peacefully within existing institutions, 
expressing themselves without rebelling against the institutional 
order.177  A given statute, rule, regulation or interpretation must be 
consistent with statements of higher-level authorities and with any 
applicable CCP policies, which may or may not have been made 
public.178 
Earlier, ‘flexible legal institutions’ were defined as those 
whose meanings and applications are substantially open to question.  
Accordingly, those who encounter flexible institutions experience 
uncertainty as to the institutions’ precise meanings, the implications 
of such institutions for their actions, and even whether the 
institutions in question apply to them.179  Three types of flexibility—
substantive, enforcement, and systemic—exist to some degree in 
every legal system.180  The laws of most nations are reduced to 
writing.  When that writing contains gaps or ambiguities, 
substantive flexibilities arise.181  Substantive flexibilities impose 
uncertainties on regulated parties by failing to specify easily and 
comprehensively the meanings and applications of the rules 
delineated in official, written form.182  PRC law today contains high 
degrees of substantive flexibility, as when a statute or administrative 
rule is rife with the vagueness or ambiguity, undefined terms, 
                                                            
176 “Legal fragmentation is an essential part of China’s political 
system[.]” YONGNIAN ZHENG, CONTEMPORARY CHINA: A HISTORY SINCE 1978, 
at 140 (2014); accord Gabriella Montinola et al., Federalism, Chinese Style: The 
Political Basis for Economic Success in China, 48 WORLD POL. 50 (1995). 
177 See, e.g., Philip C.C. Huang, Divorce Law Practices and the Origins, 
Myths, and Realities of Judicial ‘Mediation’ in China, 31 MOD. CHINA 151, 175–
80 (2005) (discussing divorce law and mediation as means to resolve conflicts and 
thereby disincentivize opposition to the law itself); see also Lan, supra note 8, at 
426 (noting that legal ambiguity accommodates competing visions and thus 
discourages overt conflicts between them). 
178 See generally Corne, supra note 7 (discussing secretive laws in 
China); see also Sebastian Heilmann & Nicole Schulte-Kulkman, The Limits of 
Policy Diffusion: Introducing International Norms of Anti-Money Laundering 
into China’s Legal System, 24 GOVERNANCE 639, 653 (2011). 
179 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
180 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 371–82. 
181 Id. at 372–77. 
182 Id. 
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broadly worded discretions, omissions, principle-like 
pronouncements, or general catch-all phrases that are common in 
written Chinese laws.183 
Additionally, to the extent that variations or inconsistencies 
exist in the enforcement of laws, enforcement flexibilities exist.184  
Enforcement flexibilities impose uncertainties by raising doubts as 
to which rules will actually carry the force of law in practice under 
various circumstances, times, and places.185  The PRC legal system 
exhibits considerable enforcement flexibilities; the country’s 
intellectual property laws provide a high-profile example.186  
Finally, the law is a process, consisting of numerous subparts 
interacting with one another.187  Interactions between the constituent 
parts of the rule of law process, the legal system’s interactions with 
the extra-legal forces of its environment, and complexities arising 
from such internal features as the number and nature of rule-makers, 
all generate systemic flexibilities.188  This type of flexibility can 
multiply and amplify the frequency and degree to which regulated 
parties experience legal uncertainty, whether in conjunction with or 
independent of the other types of legal flexibility.  In the PRC, the 
state apparatus is pervaded by unclear boundaries of authority and 
myriad rule makers exist at all levels of the state.  These bureaucratic 
units often act without a clear basis of authority and the resulting 
legal norms compete and conflict with one another.189 
Because these three forms of legal flexibility pervade 
China’s legal system, the PRC can be characterized as a ‘low rule of 
                                                            
183 See supra Part III.A. 
184 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 377–80. 
185 Id. 
186 Although the PRC has recently established specialized courts to 
address the enforcement of intellectual property, see Daniel C. Fleming, 
Counterfeiting in China, 10 U. Pᴀ. E. ASIA L. REV. 14, 29–30 (2015), significant 
variations persist in practice, see, e.g., JAMES M. ZIMMERMAN, 2 CHINA LAW 
DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 665–68 (4th 
ed. 2014). More generally, “[l]egal implementation in the PRC tends to be ad hoc, 
haphazard and lacking in consistency.”  CORNE, supra note 159, at 189. 
187 See Zhu, supra note 145, at 432.  
188 Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 380–82. 
189 DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 
OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 188–93 (2nd ed., 2003). 
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law’ jurisdiction that often fails to promote easy predictability for 
regulated parties.190  The uncertainties emanating from these 
flexibilities tend to discourage rather than empower economic 
actors.191  Given the importance of economic activity for China’s 
social stability and for the Party’s own interests, the question arises 
why the Party has elected for such a flexible institutional 
arrangement.  History and institutional theory afford new insights 
into this question, to which we now turn. 
B. Event Sequencing: Explaining China’s Legal Flexibility 
The arrangement described above seems counterintuitive: 
while economic growth remains a high priority for the CCP,192 the 
PRC’s legal institutions are plainly inconsistent with the 
prescription of growth facilitated by legal clarity and certainty.193  
Informal institutions contribute to the PRC’s success,194 but cannot 
substitute altogether for formal ones.195  Since “law is . . . 
                                                            
190 See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 336 (defining high rule of law 
jurisdictions as those with “transparent legal systems that empower firms to plan 
and act in the economic realm” and, in contrast, low rule of law jurisdictions as 
those “where opaque legal systems create economic uncertainties and risks”); 
accord id. at 382–87 (discussing these terms in the context of the three types of 
legal flexibility); see also supra note 4 (drawing this distinction). 
191 See supra Part I. 
192 See infra Part III.C.  
193 See Evans & Gabel, supra note 3, at 350–56 (discussing the 
Normative Coase Theorem and related ideas). 
194 For more on the impact of informal institutions, see generally Qingxiu 
Bu, Will Chinese Legal Culture Constrain Its Corporate Governance-Related 
Laws?, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 103 (2015); KELLEE S. TSAI, CAPITALISM WITHOUT 
DEMOCRACY: THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2007); LILY L. 
TSAI, ACCOUNTABILITY WITHOUT DEMOCRACY: SOLIDARY GROUPS AND PUBLIC 
GOODS PROVISION IN RURAL CHINA (2007); Lan, supra note 8. 
195 See generally Kevin J. Fandl, The Role of Informal Legal Institutions 
in Economic Development, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1 (2008); accord Lan, supra 
note 8, at 421–23, 426 (noting that while informal institutions can substitute for 
formal ones in certain instances, these situations create problems and thus, formal 
institutions are often needed). And even where interests (like property) can be 
secured informally, this usually imposes far greater transaction costs than do 
formal rules. 
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inseparable from the state,”196 more is needed to understand why the 
CCP came to favor such a flexible legal regime.  The PRC’s legal 
flexibility did not come about by accident or solely by path 
dependence.197  This section employs historical event sequencing to 
better understand the CCP’s choice of a highly flexible legal 
system.198 
Most of China’s long history is too remote to map its 
influence in the creation of the flexible legal system that currently 
exists.199 Therefore, the examination of Chinese legal evolution will 
begin with the first Opium War.200  Between the start of this conflict 
in 1839 and the ascension of the reformers in 1978, two parallel 
sequences of events defined China’s experience: first, a chain of 
immensely disruptive and traumatic calamities imposed by foreign 
                                                            
196 Stanley Diamond, The Rule of Law Versus the Order of Custom, in 
THE RULE OF LAW 115, 119 (Robert Paul Wolff ed., 1971). 
197 See AN CHEN, RESTRUCTURING POLITICAL POWER IN CHINA: 
ALLIANCE & OPPOSITION 1978–1998, at 157–58 (1999); Slater, supra note 165, at 
164. In institutional theory, path dependence seeks to explain why 
institutionalization occurs (that is, why institutions become entrenched over time). 
More specifically, path dependence refers to the effects of positive feedback, such 
that “[f]urther developments in the same direction are rewarded, whereas the costs 
of switching to an alternative increase over time.” See SCOTT, supra note 26, at 
144-45. More formally, “[a]s a theoretical framework, path dependence provides 
an explanation for potentially problematic long-term outcomes that deliberately 
decentralizes agency by referring to a system logic of self-reinforcing processes 
triggered by contingent events.” Leonhard Dobusch & Elke Schüßler, Theorizing 
Path Dependence: A Review of Positive Feedback Mechanisms in Technology 
Markets, Regional Clusters, and Organizations, 22 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 617, 
618 (2012). Path dependence “implies that history matters in the long-term 
evolution of” economies, political systems, and so forth. A. Jakimowicz, Path 
Dependence in Neoclassical Economic Growth Theory, 127 ACTA PHYSICA 
POLONICA A-86, A-86 (2015). In the present context, path dependence would 
imply that the flexibility of China’s legal system was ‘inherited’ as an inevitable 
consequence of certain historical factors that had persisted across time. This Paper 
argues, however, that China’s legal flexibility was introduced by strategic design, 
more so than by historical happenstance. 
198 See supra Part II.B (discussing event sequencing). 
199 See GADDIS, supra note 103 (noting the “principle of diminishing 
relevance”). 
200 Others also designate the first Opium War as the start of China’s 
modern history. See, e.g., ROBERT BICKERS, THE SCRAMBLE FOR CHINA: FOREIGN 
DEVILS IN THE QING EMPIRE, 1832–1914, at 10 (2011).  
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powers during China’s ‘Century of Humiliation,’ and second, a 
series of equally scarring misfortunes instigated within China.  
Following Nasra and Dacin, the analysis segments the relevant 
historical events into different time periods and traces the major 
events and the status of the legal system in each.   Figure 2 depicts 
the most salient events, which are discussed throughout the 
remainder of this section. 
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The PRC has utilized history to shape its institutions.  
History is also central to how Westerners view China.  Robert 
Bickers states that “[w]e cannot understand the resurgence of China 
now, and its . . . anger at the world, unless we understand the 
traumatic century which followed the first opium war . . . For mere 
history matters in modern China, and the past is unfinished 
business.”201  Below, the Paper tracks the major events of China’s 
recent history (what institutional theory calls its “critical junctures”) 
to interpret the influences that shaped the reformers who would 
eventually enact China’s contemporary legal system.  This history 
masks the shrewdness that enabled the reformers first to seize power 
and then to retain it against seemingly long odds.  Their principal 
weapon of choice in these struggles was institutional 
entrepreneurship—the very competency in which the reformers 
sought to establish an enduring competitive advantage for the CCP.  
To explain, then, why the PRC’s reformers opted for a flexible 
formal legal system, we begin by examining the final decades of 
China’s last imperial dynasty—the Qing. 
 
1. Final years of the Qing (1839–1912) 
Commerce between China and England flourished in the 
1700s.202  The British had accommodated China’s “Canton 
system,”203 but subsequently began agitating for broader access to 
Chinese markets.204  By the 1830s, relations between China and 
foreign merchants had been strained for some fifty years, and 
various cultural factors heightened these tensions.205  Qing law 
                                                            
201  Id.  
202 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 195. 
203 See id. (“[A]fter 1759 Guangzhou (Canton) was made the sole port 
open for Europeans.”). 
204 JULIA LOVELL, THE OPIUM WAR: DRUGS, DREAMS, AND THE MAKING 
OF MODERN CHINA 78 (2011). 
205 Cultural factors heightened these tensions. W. TRAVIS HANES III & 
FRANK SANELLO, THE OPIUM WARS: THE ADDICTION OF ONE EMPIRE AND THE 
CORRUPTION OF ANOTHER 13 (2002). Westerners viewed China as an “alien, 
hostile nation[.]” LOVELL, supra note 204, at 80. The Chinese, for their part, 
labeled foreigners ‘barbarians.’ PETER WARD FAY, THE OPIUM WAR 1840–1842, 
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played a visible role as Westerners pressed for special legal 
privileges, and Qing citizens resented perceived concessions.206  The 
impetus for the first Opium War involved a dispute of access: 
“British merchants wanted to sell their goods . . . along the eastern 
coast” while “the Qing . . . wanted to confine trade to Canton and 
ban opium.”207  Opium produced in India was shipped to China,208 
where its sale generated large revenue flows for the British, but 
resulted in high rates of addiction and a massive outflow of silver as 
payment.209  When the Qing government halted the drug’s sale in 
1839, in part by destroying foreigners’ inventories, the British navy 
attacked.210  China had not industrialized211 and was soon overrun, 
resulting in the one-sided Treaty of Nanjing in 1842.212  Additional 
‘unequal treaties’ soon followed as the U.S., France, Russia and 
others extracted concessions213 including rights to impose their laws 
                                                            
at 30–31 (1997). See also JOHN KEAY, CHINA: A HISTORY 446–49 (2009) 
(describing George Macartney’s efforts to open China for the British in 1793); 
JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS OF BEIJING: GLOBAL CURRENTS IN 
CHINESE HISTORY 137 (2000) (discussing Chinese jurisdiction over foreigners 
prior to the Opium War).   
206 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 123–28. Legal issues within and 
between China and Britain were immensely influential in Britain’s decision to go 
to war.  See LI CHEN, CHINESE LAW IN IMPERIAL EYES: SOVEREIGNTY, JUSTICE, 
AND TRANSCULTURAL POLITICS 201–42 (2016). 
207 LOVELL, supra note 204, at 78. 
208 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 198–99. 
209 Id.; accord JONATHAN FENBY, THE PENGUIN HISTORY OF MODERN 
CHINA: THE FALL AND RISE OF A GREAT POWER 1850 TO THE PRESENT 14–15 (2nd 
ed. 2013) [hereinafter THE PENGUIN HISTORY]. 
210 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 200. 
211 DREYER, supra note 36, at 42–45; see also JUSTIN YIFU LIN, 
DEMYSTIFYING THE CHINESE ECONOMY 1 (2012) (attributing China’s defeat to its 
weak economy and inability to fund a stronger military). 
212 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 200. 
213 Id. at 201–05. 
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extraterritorially.214  These nations effectively colonized China215 
and successfully pursued institutional entrepreneurship even as the 
Qing Empire imploded.216  Such indignities began China’s ‘Century 
of Humiliation,’ which lasted from the 1840s to the 1940s.217  These 
events remain politically relevant even today.218 
The closing decades of Qing history were set against this 
backdrop.  Anti-British violence219 and rebellions220 erupted.  
Several treaties were renegotiated,221 and as Japan defeated China 
                                                            
214 For example, Congress created a United States Court for China that 
sat in Shanghai and exercised jurisdiction over Americans there. Teemu Ruskola, 
Colonialism Without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial Jurisprudence of the U.S. 
Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217 (2008); see also ZIMMERMAN, 
supra note 186, at 47–56 (discussing the United States’ extraterritorial 
jurisdiction). Nineteen countries ultimately secured extraterritorial privileges in 
China. ZIMMERMAN, supra note 186, at 48–49 n.17. 
215 See generally BICKERS, supra note 200; see also DREYER, supra note 
36, at 47-53; KEAY, supra note 205, at 490–91; JONATHAN SPENCE, THE CHINA 
HELPERS 215 (1969) (discussing Nationalists’ discontent with foreign military 
presence) [hereinafter THE CHINA HELPERS]; WALEY-COHEN, supra note 205, at 
167 (“Even though China had not become a formal colony . . . its independence 
seemed to have become a dead letter” by 1911); Benj. H. Williams, The Protection 
of American Citizens in China: Extraterritoriality, 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 49–53 
(1922) (noting resentment among Chinese citizenry of foreign tribunals and 
observing that “[e]xtraterritoriality is a distinct impairment of sovereignty”). 
216 See, e.g., HANS VAN DE VEN, BREAKING WITH THE PAST: THE 
MARITIME CUSTOMS SERVICE AND THE GLOBAL ORIGINS OF MODERNITY IN 
CHINA 134 (2014) (discussing the transition of China’s Maritime Customs Service 
into “a debt-collection agency for foreign bondholders”). 
217 FLEMMING CHRISTIANSEN & SHIRIN RAI, CHINESE POLITICS AND 
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 27–80 (1996); see generally DAVID SCOTT, CHINA 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 1840–1949 (2008). 
218  In an effort to promote the Party’s legitimacy, CCP leaders have kept 
the Century of Humiliation at the forefront of public memory. Alison A. Kaufman, 
The “Century of Humiliation,” Then and Now: Chinese Perceptions of the 
International Order, 25 PAC. AFF. 1 (2010); Randall Peerenboom, China Stands 
Up: 100 Years of Humiliation, Sovereignty Concerns, and Resistance to Foreign 
Pressure on PRC Courts, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 653, 654–56 (2010); ZHENG 
WANG, NEVER FORGET NATIONAL HUMILIATION: HISTORICAL MEMORY IN 
CHINESE POLITICS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS (2012). 
219 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 162. 
220 Id. at 170–78, 184–93. 
221 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 201. 
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in a war to control Korea in 1894-95,222 Chinese nationalism rose 
sharply.223  The empire flirted with acquiring Western technology, 
but when exposure to Western thought induced an anti-authoritarian 
sentiment in Chinese students sent to the U.S. for education, Qing 
officials suspended further exchanges.224  In 1898, Empress Cixi 
stifled the progressives’ attempts at reform, but by 1901 the need for 
legal reform was apparent.225  The Empress asked senior officials to 
compare Chinese governmental and legal systems with those of the 
West and to recommend adaptations.226  It was only in this brief 
interlude that Qing officials embraced commercial law as a means 
to restore China’s economic sovereignty and to end 
extraterritoriality.227  By 1908, officials were laying the groundwork 
for a constitutional monarchy,228 but the empire fell before 
substantial changes could be implemented.229  Conservatives 
reinstalled themselves and rejected all changes to the imperial 
system.230 
Although Qing officials viewed the economy strategically, 
they regulated it mostly ineffectually.231  Significantly, private 
                                                            
222 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 222–24; see also KEAY, supra note 
205, at 484–89 (discussing how Japan’s modernization had greatly exceeded 
China’s). 
223 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 230–38. 
224 See YONG ZHAO, WHO’S AFRAID OF THE BIG BAD DRAGON?: WHY 
CHINA HAS THE BEST (AND WORST) EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD 71–92 
(2014).  
225 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 224–27. 
226 HAROLD M. TANNER, CHINA: A HISTORY 406–07 (2009). 
227 William C. Kirby, China Unincorporated: Company Law and 
Business Enterprise in Twentieth-Century China, 54 J. ASIAN STUD. 43 (1995). 
228 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 246. 
229 PÄR KRISTOFFER CASSEL, GROUNDS OF JUDGMENT: 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND IMPERIAL POWER IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CHINA 
AND JAPAN 175–76 (2012). 
230 Kang Youwei and the Reform Movement, in 2 SOURCES OF CHINESE 
TRADITION 260, 263 (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Richard Lufrano eds., 1999) 
(noting that “[s]upporters of [Qing] rule [would] resist any . . .  tampering with its 
institutions”); TANNER, supra note 226, at 409 (noting that conservatives rose in 
“storms of opposition” even to “seemingly small” changes.). 
231 Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt, Introduction, in TO ACHIEVE 
SECURITY AND WEALTH 1, 2–3 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 1992). 
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entrepreneurs and their guilds became extremely powerful, 
displacing many local Qing governments as the source of power.232  
This state of affairs taught future CCP leaders to be weary of power 
derived from private wealth.233  The Qing’s legitimacy was 
undermined by the sense that “China’s destiny now [laid] in the 
hands of foreigners who bore her little goodwill,”234 and by the 
state’s own persistent inadaptability.235  In 1912, the last emperor 
was ousted and the Republic of China was established236—but the 
optimism greeting this occasion was soon dispelled, as China 
descended into a period of extraordinary violence from 1912 to 
1950.237 
                                                            
The Maoists would later view this degree of economic autonomy as a national 
weakness. See infra Parts III.B.3, III.B.4.  
232 JONATHAN FENBY, MODERN CHINA: THE  RISE AND FALL OF A GREAT 
POWER, 1850 TO THE PRESENT 150–51 (2008) [hereinafter MODERN CHINA]; 
MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 148–49 (1982); R. KEITH 
SCHOPPA, REVOLUTION AND ITS PAST: IDENTITIES AND CHANGE IN MODERN 
CHINESE HISTORY 150–51 (3rd ed. 2011); RICHARD VON GLAHN, THE ECONOMIC 
HISTORY OF CHINA: FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 395 (2016). 
The Qing relied upon guilds to deliver services. Andrea McElderry, Guarantors 
and Guarantees in Qing Government-Business Relations, in TO ACHIEVE 
SECURITY AND WEALTH 119, 128–30 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 
1992); Christine Moll-Murata, Chinese Guilds from the Seventeenth to the 
Twentieth Centuries: An Overview, 53 INT’L REV. SOC. HIST. 213, 219 (2008). 
But in conferring legitimacy, the Qing unwittingly invited the guilds to compete 
with the state for power. WELLINGTON K.K. CHAN, MERCHANTS, MANDARINS, 
AND MODERN ENTERPRISE IN LATE CH’ING CHINA 234 (1977). One suspects that 
China’s corporatist approach heeds these historical lessons. See generally 
Jonathan Unger & Anita Chan, State Corporatism and Business Associations in 
China, 10 INT’L J. EMERGING MKTS. 178 (2015).  
233 See, e.g., BRUCE J. DICKSON, WEALTH INTO POWER: THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY’S EMBRACE OF CHINA’S PRIVATE SECTOR 238 (2008) (discussing the 
Party’s cooptation of capitalists, who now defend Party rule) [hereinafter 
WEALTH INTO POWER]; see also infra Part III.C. 
234 RANA MITTER, A BITTER REVOLUTION: CHINA’S STRUGGLE WITH THE 
MODERN WORLD 35 (2004). 
235 Id. at 37. 
236 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 267. 
237 KEAY, supra note 205, at 499–500. 
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 During this period, China’s legal system reflected its long-
standing historical features,238 aligned with Confucian mores239 
such that “the law was . . . but a tool of administration in general.”240  
Western powers had imposed extraterritoriality because they viewed 
Chinese law as “barbaric.”241  Local magistrates rigidly applied 
Chinese criminal codes.242  The institutional status of law clearly 
varied between China and the West.  However, officials eventually 
endorsed reform as the only hope for the Qing’s survival,243 and 
institutions free from the state’s control had begun to emerge in 
response.244  Yet China’s bureaucratic inertia nevertheless 
prevailed—this time, at the cost of the regime itself.245 
2. Republic of China (1912–1949) 
The Kuomintang (“KMT”), or Nationalist Party, emerged 
victorious in China’s first election in 1913.246  Following a failed 
                                                            
238 See STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA 
AFTER MAO 23 (1999) (noting that Qing law was addressed to officials and not to 
the public); THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 123–28 (discussing the status of 
foreigners under Qing law); see FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 155, 
183–86 (discussing pre-Qing and Qing laws, respectively). 
239 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 184. 
240 Id. at 185. 
241 SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 57. 
242 “If a socially undesirable act did not correspond exactly to one of the 
Qing Code’s precisely-defined offenses, a magistrate could punish it by analogy 
to an existing offense or under the rule which” provided punishments for 
“[e]veryone who does that which ought not to be done[.]” TANNER, supra note 
226, at 357. 
243 See e.g., Kang Youwei, Memorial on Institutional Reform, in 
SOURCES IN CHINESE HISTORY 100–01 (David G. Atwill & Yurong Y. Atwill eds., 
2010); THE CHINA HELPERS, supra note 215, at 156.   
244 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 257. 
245 The reformers took this lesson seriously. The USSR later fell in part 
because it faced an entrenched bureaucracy opposed to economic reforms (much 
like the Qing), and thus, the USSR was forced to introduce political reforms 
together with economic ones. See SUSAN L. SHIRK, THE POLITICAL LOGIC OF 
ECONOMIC REFORM IN CHINA 333–34 (1993).  In contrast, the reformers’ 
flexibility enabled economic reforms with far fewer political reforms. Id. 
246 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 280. Even so, the early 
revolutionaries could not articulate their own logics. See DAVID STRAND, AN 
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attempt by the provisional president and Nationalist rival Yuan 
Shikai to make himself emperor,247 the KMT came to dominate the 
Republican government.  Yuan’s monarchical efforts diminished the 
possibility of democracy in China.248  From Yuan’s death in 1916 
until the KMT’s Northern Expedition ended in 1928, local warlords 
who ruled small fiefdoms with personal armies controlled most of 
China.249 
Foreign states continued to antagonize China, giving rise to 
the May Fourth Movement following World War I.250  The 
Versailles Treaty transferred German colonies in China to Japan, 
rather than back to China.251  The May Fourth Movement presaged 
China’s twentieth-century history252 through the ideas that 
emerged.253  A consensus among intellectuals arose “that traditional 
Chinese culture . . . was largely to blame”254 for China’s lack of 
sovereignty, finding fault in Confucianism.255  The Movement 
combined elements that previously existed only separately: “a sense 
of real and impending crisis, a combination of . . . ideas aimed at 
‘saving the nation’, and an audience ready to receive, welcome, 
contest, and adapt these ideas.”256  The KMT failed to articulate a 
credible new set of logics, even as the public rejected many long-
standing assumptions.  This was a missed opportunity for 
institutional entrepreneurship and, ironically, Chinese intellectuals 
turned to other countries for inspiration.  Among the foreign 
                                                            
UNFINISHED REPUBLIC: LEADING BY WORD AND DEED IN MODERN CHINA 55 
(2011).  
247 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 283–87. 
248 See THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 125–38 (discussing 
Yuan’s rise to the presidency and actions inconsistent with democracy). 
249 TANNER, supra note 226, at 429–31. 
250 MITTER, supra note 234, at 37. 
251 Id. at 3.  
252 Id. at 4, 11; accord ALAN LAWRANCE, CHINA SINCE 1919: 
REVOLUTION AND REFORM 1 (2004). 
253 MITTER, supra note 234, at 13. The CCP’s first generation of leaders 
came of age in this era. KEAY, supra note 205, at 504. 
254 MITTER, supra note 234, at 14–15. 
255 Id. at 18. 
256 Id. at 23. 
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concepts that gained traction in this climate were Marxism and 
Communism.257 
The CCP’s founding in 1921 was thus undertaken amidst 
great social turbulence.258  The CCP positioned itself rhetorically as 
the solution to warlord rule.259  Because the Republic and the USSR 
collaborated in the 1920s,260 and since the KMT and CCP shared the 
goal of unifying China,261 the two groups were tenuously allied 
through the start of the Northern Expedition—the KMT’s largely 
successful military effort to remove the warlords and thereby 
reunify the country. 262 But this alliance, known as the First United 
Front, disintegrated quickly when United Front forces retook 
Shanghai: the KMT blamed the Communists for civil unrest and 
cracked down on left-wing organizations.263  For its part, at the 
behest of the Soviets, the CCP began insurrections in 1927; the 
Nationalists expelled Communists from government offices,264 and 
the Chinese Civil War was thereby inaugurated.265  Until 1937, the 
KMT controlled most of China’s urban centers and held the 
advantage as its military pursued and nearly destroyed Communist 
forces.  The CCP elicited support covertly in the cities as well as in 
the countryside,266 aiding peasant associations and establishing an 
agrarian regime called the Jiangxi Soviet.267  A turning point 
occurred when Japan, which had seized Manchuria in 1931,268 
                                                            
257 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 305–10, 319–25. 
258 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 275–78. 
259 See First Manifesto of the CCP on the Current Situation (June 15, 
1922), in SOURCES IN CHINESE HISTORY 176 (David G. Atwill & Yurong Y. 
Atwill eds., 2010). 
260 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 336. 
261 Id. 
262 TANNER, supra note 226, at 459. 
263 J.A.G. ROBERTS, THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF CHINA 371–72 (2003). 
264 Id. at 372–73; accord MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 167–96 
(detailing the tensions leading to the breakdown of the First United Front). 
265 TANNER, supra note 226, at 460–63. 
266 Id. at 463–73. 
267 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 345, 355–57, 370–79. 
268 THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 229–43. 
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initiated a full invasion of China in 1937.269 Japan’s aggression 
would prove disastrous for the Nationalists. 270  
The KMT’s weaknesses were exposed as it struggled to 
retain control even of the regions outside of Japan’s conquest.271  
Chiang Kai-shek, the KMT’s ruler, regarded the CCP as the greater 
threat, and his allocation of resources against the Communists 
eroded his popular support,272 particularly as the Japanese carried 
out atrocities against Chinese civilians.273  Chiang eventually agreed 
to a ceasefire with the CCP—the Second United Front—so that both 
could combat the Japanese; however, this truce was quickly undone, 
and the Communists’ popularity in China’s rural areas surged.274  In 
institutional terms, the Communists were not merely providing 
governmental services in the areas they controlled; they were 
winning converts to their ideology and asserting new logics, acting 
as institutional entrepreneurs.275  Upon Japan’s defeat in 1945, the 
Civil War resumed—this time with a weakened KMT military and 
a strengthened Communist force.276  Although worsening economic 
conditions did not immediately help the Communist cause,277 the 
CCP’s support continued to grow as it implemented rural land 
                                                            
269 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 312. 
270  It is ironic that the CCP benefitted from the aggression of the fiercely 
anti-communist Japanese. THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 229.  
271 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 314. The KMT’s 
conscriptions, for instance, were unpopular, and the KMT was blamed for China’s 
wartime famines. Id. at 314–16. 
272 WALEY-COHEN, supra note 205, at 232–33. 
273 See, e.g., SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 261–63. 
274 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 316. China’s regions were 
unevenly developed, affording the CCP the chance to attract rural support. ODD 
ARNE WESTAD, RESTLESS EMPIRE: CHINA AND THE WORLD SINCE 1750, at 176 
(2012).  
275 Various works have assessed the CCP’s rural appeal. See, e.g., EDGAR 
SNOW, RED STAR OVER CHINA 267–71 (1961) (describing one Nationalist won 
over by the CCP’s efforts). 
276 See JAY TAYLOR, THE GENERALISSIMO: CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR MODERN CHINA 321–77 (2009). “The eight-year war with Japan 
had been an extended body-blow for a regime [the KMT] already shot through 
with weaknesses.” JONATHAN FENBY, CHIANG KAI SHEK: CHINA’S 
GENERALISSIMO AND THE NATION HE LOST 460 (2003) [hereinafter CHIANG KAI 
SHEK].  
277 TAYLOR, supra note 276, at 369. 
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reforms278 while Nationalist policies did little to improve the 
agrarian livelihood.279  The KMT was also plagued by corruption 
and incompetence. The KMT’s many missteps, coupled with the 
CCP’s strategy of building a power base in the rural areas, moved 
the public’s ‘collective memory’280 to accept and validate the 
Maoists’ institutional logics.281  The Republic had delayed its fall 
through nationalism and alliances with other troubled states,282 but 
the CCP nevertheless overran the KMT, and Mao declared the 
founding of the PRC on October 1, 1949.283 
The KMT had modeled its legal system on Western 
examples,284 but the Republican period is noteworthy for how little 
the law actually functioned in light of extraterritoriality and the 
KMT’s conflicts with the warlords, Japan, and the Communists—
suggesting that even when they were militarily successful, the 
Nationalists were ineffective institutional entrepreneurs.  
Contemporary observers noted that the Nationalists’ “enlightened” 
law was seldom observed in practice.285  Nevertheless, this era 
contributed to the historical context in which the designers of 
China’s contemporary legal system were embedded. China 
internationalized under the Republic as foreigners encouraged a 
capitalist bent.286  It is notable that during the Republic, as in the 
Qing era, guilds and other economic elites were able to displace 
local governments and formal law.287   
                                                            
278 See, e.g., THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 491 (discussing land reform 
and the Manchurian base). 
279 RICHARDSON, supra note 23, at 97. 
280 See William Ocasio et al., History, Society, and Institutions: The Role 
of Collective Memory in the Emergence and Evolution of Societal Logics, 41 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 676 (2016).   
281 The CCP had, for example, offered a more compelling interpretation 
of China’s unequal treaties. DONG WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES: 
NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY 87–95 (2005). The Maoists’ institutional logics 
are considered in further detail in Part III.B.4, infra.   
282 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 169. 
283 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 504–13. 
284 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 170. 
285  Williams, supra note 215, at 57–58. 
286 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 171. 
287 See, e.g., MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 150–51; SCHOPPA, 
supra note 232, at 150–51. 
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Communist leaders learned to be adaptable and regenerative 
as the CCP struggled to survive in this era.288  The reformers who 
would eventually design China’s legal system were embedded in an 
environment that not only legitimized but necessitated 
adaptability.289  The reformers’ versatility also foreshadowed their 
success in positioning the CCP as China’s preeminent institutional 
entrepreneur through legal flexibility.290 
 
3. People’s Republic of China under Mao (1949–1976) 
As discussed above, China’s experience prior to the 
establishment of the PRC was tumultuous, violent, and essentially 
lawless, largely because of what foreign powers were doing—but 
often also for mistakes among China’s own leaders.291  Upon the 
CCP’s victory in 1949, China was—for the first time in a century—
free from coercive foreign influences.  Unfortunately, the Maoist era 
would prove even more destructive than the previous periods, as 
Mao attempted first to remake China into the world’s premiere 
socialist society, and then, having failed at this, to maintain control 
of the CCP as pressure for equanimity mounted in the last decades 
of his life.  
Upon taking power, the CCP first confronted the task of 
constructing a new state.292  This was Mao’s earliest priority: a 
formal state would legitimize the CCP as China’s sole ruling body 
                                                            
288 The Party’s Long March is often cited as an example of these traits. 
See, e.g., MODERN CHINA, supra note 232, at 252–64. Professor Gaddis states that: 
“[S]urvivors tend to be those organisms that are required to adapt . . . to the 
unexpected . . .  There is, thus, a balance . . . [at] the edge of chaos . . . where 
innovation, especially through self-organization, normally occurs. It is no great 
stretch to suggest that something similar may work in the social, political, and 
economic world[.]” GADDIS, supra note 103, at 87. This is descriptive of the 
CCP’s experience in this era. 
289 The CCP remains highly adaptive even today. RICHARD MCGREGOR, 
THE PARTY: THE SECRET WORLD OF CHINA’S COMMUNIST RULERS 31 (2010).  
290 See infra Part III.C. 
291 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 165. 
292 FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE TRAGEDY OF LIBERATION: A HISTORY OF THE 
CHINESE REVOLUTION 1945–1957, at 39–152 (2013) [hereinafter THE TRAGEDY]; 
FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 345–51. 
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(a distinction also claimed by the KMT in Taiwan).293  Under this 
early arrangement, the state’s authority was shared amongst the 
Party, the military, and the nascent bureaucracy.294 The process of 
state building included the basic functions of government295 but also 
involved the rooting out of perceived enemies.296  Whereas the 
Qing’s enemies had been mostly foreign, the CCP’s enemies were 
internal.297  Class struggle encouraged citizens to act out against 
capitalists, landlords, rich peasants, Nationalist sympathizers, and 
counterrevolutionaries.298  Even the CCP was purged when it 
appeared more burdensome than helpful to Mao’s ends, presaging 
the Cultural Revolution a decade later.299 
During the 1950s, the CCP enjoyed most of the successes it 
would realize under Mao.  China had, for instance, fought the U.S. 
to a standstill in Korea, collectivized agriculture and industry, 
implemented its first Five Year Plan of production,300 and carried 
out campaigns to imbue citizens with political consciousness.301  Yet 
Mao remained anxious to implement socialism.  He prepared for this 
during the Hundred Flowers Movement and Anti-Rightist 
Campaign of 1956-1957, through which he attempted to eliminate 
critics in society.302  Convinced of the success of these efforts, Mao 
then launched his infamous Great Leap Forward.  
The Great Leap ostensibly sought to surpass Great Britain’s 
economic output by collectivizing property and mobilizing China’s 
                                                            
293 See THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 519–24. A state was also 
necessary for China to reassert its sovereignty. Bedeski, supra note 54, at 546. 
294 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 519. 
295 THE TRAGEDY, supra note 292, at 46. 
296 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 321. 
297 Id. at 321–22. 
298 WALDER, supra note 39, at 113. 
299 THE TRAGEDY, supra note 292, at 158–59. 
300 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 327; see also THE SEARCH, supra note 
155, at 541–51 (discussing the Party’s first Five-Year Plan). 
301 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 534–37. 
302 Id. at 563–73. Citizens were encouraged to criticize the Party and 
those who did later faced a crackdown in 1957 to discourage future opposition to 
the socialist economic transformation. 
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labor force to meet planned levels of production.303  Mao’s actual 
ambition, however, was to claim the mantle of socialist leadership 
by surpassing the USSR,304 and to repay the debts that China had 
incurred by accepting Soviet industrial aid.305  The Great Leap was 
catastrophic,306 with an estimated 30 million fatalities:307 famine 
was the leading cause of death, while “coercion, terror and 
systematic violence were [its] foundation[.]”308 
Even for Mao, the results were difficult to ignore.309  He 
retreated from public view in the early 1960s, and other Party 
leaders “began to reverse some of the worst excesses”310 of the Great 
Leap.311  China remained isolated internationally.312  As the Party 
pursued reforms and with his power slipping, Mao launched the 
Socialist Education Movement, the goal of which was to 
“reintroduce basic socialist values into Chinese society.”313  Its 
failure to expunge corruption and abuse from the Party set the stage 
for Mao’s final move, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.  
After the Great Leap,  the Cultural Revolution was Mao’s 
second attempt to create a model society that would lead the socialist 
                                                            
303 FRANK DIKÖTTER, MAO’S GREAT FAMINE: THE HISTORY OF CHINA’S 
MOST DEVASTATING CATASTROPHE, 1958–1962, at ix (2010) [hereinafter MAO’S 
GREAT FAMINE]. 
304 FRANK DIKÖTTER, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: A PEOPLE’S 
HISTORY, 1962–1976, at 4 (2016) [hereinafter THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION]. 
305 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 575. 
306 See THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 396–439 (discussing 
the Great Leap and its aftermath). 
307 Id. at 415. 
308 MAO’S GREAT FAMINE, supra note 303, at x–xi; accord WESTAD, 
supra note 274, at 339. 
309 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 590. 
310 WESTAD, supra note 274, at 339. 
311 Mao “was happy to . . . let others begin to clear up the mess he had 
created, though he kept close watch[.]” Id.  
312 Id. at 333. Mao “had, almost [single-handedly], managed to wreck the 
Sino-Soviet relationship.” Id. at 343. Mao resented the USSR’s visibility in the 
global communist movement, disapproval of the Great Leap, and repudiation of 
Stalinism. THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 403, 421–23. 
313 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 591–96. The movement sought to 
repair the Party’s legitimacy by “clean[ing] out . . . abuses in the CCP[.]” THE 
PENGUIN HISTORY, supra note 209, at 426–28. 
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world by supplanting the Soviet Union.314  Mao’s complex motives 
centered around keeping absolute power315 and preventing capitalist 
revisionism.316  Tensions between Mao and the Party’s 
establishment had been rising for years317 and, assured of the 
military’s support,318 Mao declared war on revisionist enemies 
within the CCP itself.319  Although Mao was viewed as the father of 
the CCP,320 he urged citizens to attack Party authorities deemed to 
be ‘counter-revolutionary.’  This reflected Mao’s conviction that 
“only violent conflict could bring about genuine social change and 
liberate the oppressed.”321  The duration of the Cultural Revolution, 
from 1966 to 1976, was lawless and violent.322  Functional 
government ceased to exist.323  Unsurprisingly, the Chinese 
economy suffered.  The Maoist economy blended markets and 
centralization but resulted in a “crippled hybrid.”324  China was 
                                                            
314 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at xi. 
315 Id. at 10–14; William A. Joseph, Foreword, in BORN RED: A 
CHRONICLE OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION xv–xvi (Yuan Gao ed., 1987); 
RODERICK MACFARQUHAR & MICHAEL SCHOENHALS, MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION 
3–12 (2006). 
316 TANNER, supra note 226, at 519–22. By “capitalist revisionism,” Mao 
meant the “abandonment of the goals of the revolution and acceptance . . .  of 
capitalism.” FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 384–86.  
317 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 389–90. 
318 Id. at 387. 
319 TANNER, supra note 226, at 524. 
320 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 385–86. 
321 WALDER, supra note 39, at 336. 
322 Benjamin Liebman & Tim Wu, China’s Network Justice, 8 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 257, 287 (2007). Mao’s fanatical supporters struggled against “counter-
revolutionaries” and sent offenders to labor in the countryside. See, e.g., THE 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304; FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 
133, at 393–95, 401–02; TANNER, supra note 226, at 535–36. Many accused of 
counterrevolution were tortured or executed. FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 
133, at 397–98. An estimated 400,000 to 500,000 people were killed in the 
Cultural Revolution’s three bloodiest years. SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 355. 
323 SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 351–55. 
324 FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 398. 
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languishing in a state of dire traumatization at the time of Mao’s 
death in 1976.325 
Upon taking power, the CCP had abolished all semblances 
of Nationalist law326 and began constructing a new legal system until 
it was swept away in the Cultural Revolution.327  The CCP’s early 
efforts at law were intended to transform Chinese culture as 
envisioned by the Party’s elites,328 but officials were impatient for 
change.  Accordingly, any aspects of the emerging legal order 
deemed too restrictive for China’s hasty revolution were 
discarded.329  The CCP’s elites instead ruled directly by fiat.330  Mao 
repeatedly disparaged the notion of bureaucracy and the stability 
that it implied, as these were antithetical to continuous revolution 
(and could also be stubbornly resistant to his will).331  It is thus 
unsurprising that Maoist leaders “were never comfortable working 
or thinking in a legal context.”332  Commensurate with the law’s 
enfeebled state was Mao’s political use of ambiguity in his speeches: 
                                                            
325  Mao destroyed institutions but did so before substitutes could be 
formulated. This scenario lent itself to corruption in the resulting institutional 
vacuum. See Lan, supra note 8, at 398 n.159 
326 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 186, at 56–59. 
327 Wang Chenguang, Introduction: An Emerging Legal System, in 
INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 1, 5–7 (Wang Chenguang and Zhang Xianchu 
eds., 1997). Soviet law was heavily borrowed in these early years. Yu Xingzhong, 
Comment, Legal Pragmatism in the People’s Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE L. 
29, 32 (1989). 
328 TANNER, supra note 226, at 507–08 (discussing as one example the 
Marriage Law of 1950). 
329 CHOW, supra note 189, at 58 (noting that Maoists despised the law 
because it discouraged their attacks on enemies); THE PENGUIN HISTORY, supra 
note 209, at 397 (discussing Liu Shaoqi’s view on this); POTTER, supra note 145, 
at 5–8 (observing that law was criticized for obstructing Mao’s policy goals). 
Eventually Mao found even this nascent law too restrictive and it was disregarded 
altogether in the Cultural Revolution. BARRETT L. MCCORMICK, POLITICAL 
REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: DEMOCRACY AND BUREAUCRACY IN A LENINIST 
STATE 96 (1990). 
330 MAO’S GREAT FAMINE, supra note 303, at 289–90; Michael, supra 
note 159, at 135–36; Yu, supra note 327, at 36. 
331 See FAIRBANK & GOLDMAN, supra note 133, at 387; accord Victor 
H. Li, The Role of Law in Communist China, 44 CHINA Q. 66, 74 (1970). 
332 Li, supra note 331, at 91. 
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he concealed his strategies in deliberately vague rhetoric.333  The 
reformers who succeeded Mao sought to institutionalize checks 
against this sort of lawlessness.334  Nevertheless, the reformers had 
no desire to constrain the CCP’s power, and their approach to legal 
ambiguity ultimately resembled Mao’s tactics far more so than the 
behaviors of high rule of law states.335   
In any event, the CCP had acted as an institutional 
entrepreneur—even under Mao.336  To this end, the CCP employed 
campaigns and mass movements in which the government and often 
the whole Chinese population were mobilized toward some common 
goal.337  Once the Party determined that formal legality was 
incompatible with its exercise of institutional entrepreneurship, it 
turned instead to more chaotic, less formal tactics to attempt its 
desired institutional changes.  One of the reformers’ early priorities 
was to remedy the Maoists’ excesses.338 
4. People’s Republic of China under Reform (1976–Present) 
Mao’s death on September 9, 1976 was a critical juncture.  
Three rival CCP factions competed to rule China in his wake:339 (1) 
                                                            
333 Mao practiced “ensnaring his enemies with the precision of a trapper.” 
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at xii–xiii. Mao had long employed 
ambiguity in his speech. See, e.g., THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 594 (noting a 
typical example). Interestingly, firms also use vagueness in their corporate 
communications when they perceive high threats of entry, thereby discouraging 
imitation and new competitors. Wei Guo, Tieying Yu & Javier Gimeno, Language 
and Competition: Communication Vagueness, Interpretation Difficulties, and 
Market Entry, 60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 2073 (2017). 
334 See infra Part III.C. 
335 See Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry, Embracing 
Uncertainty: Guerrilla Policy Style and Adaptive Governance in China, in MAO’S 
INVISIBLE HAND 1, 12–13 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011). 
336  TANNER, supra note 226, at 503 (discussing Party efforts to transform 
China). 
337 Id. 
338 See infra Parts III.B.4, III.C. 
339 Roderick MacFarquhar, The Succession to Mao and the End of 
Maoism, in 15 CAMBRIDGE HIST. OF CHINA 305 (Roderick MacFarquhar & John 
K. Fairbank eds., 1991); accord HARRY HARDING, CHINA’S SECOND 
REVOLUTION: REFORM AFTER MAO 40–69 (1987). Factionalism “is innate within 
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the radicals (ultra-leftists, led by the Gang of Four, who had 
overseen the Cultural Revolution and advocated continuous 
revolution); (2) beneficiaries of the Revolution (who rose when their 
seniors were purged, led by Mao’s designated successor Hua 
Guofeng, whose “whatever faction” attempted to strike a middle 
position between the radicals and reformers); and (3) the 
Revolution’s survivors (the reformers who ultimately coalesced 
under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping).340  Deng had been 
“rehabilitated”341 and then purged again in 1976, but survived Mao’s 
last efforts to destroy him.342  
 The Gang of Four inherited what little of Mao’s legitimacy 
proved transferable and sought absolute power rather than 
collaboration with potential allies.343  The Gang underestimated 
Hua,344 who had them arrested soon after Mao’s death.345  Many 
Chinese celebrated the Gang’s downfall, yet the CCP recognized 
that its legitimacy was tied to Mao’s.346  Thus, Hua’s rhetoric 
denounced the Gang but not Mao directly.  This decoupled citizens’ 
condemnation of Mao’s policies from Mao himself.347  The goal was 
to acknowledge the CCP’s disastrous record without discrediting its 
political authority.  
However, Hua “lacked the institutional clout and political 
charisma to shore up his power” and “[h]is reluctance to repudiate 
the Cultural Revolution was out of tune with a widespread desire for 
change.”348  In institutional terms, Hua adhered too closely to Maoist 
logics at a time when the reformers were excelling as institutional 
                                                            
the CCP political system.” JING HUANG, FACTIONALISM IN CHINESE COMMUNIST 
POLITICS 21 (2000).  
340 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 336–38, 357–58. 
341 Id. at 347–58. 
342 JUNG CHANG & JON HALLIDAY, MAO: THE UNKNOWN STORY 606–09 
(2006). 
343 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 358. 
344 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 315. 
345 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 367–70. 
346 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 316. 
347 Id.; see also MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 372–77. 
348 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 317. Rhetorically, 
Hua “had persisted with the slogans of the Cultural Revolution.” MacFarquhar, 
supra note 339, at 387. 
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entrepreneurs.349  Hua’s alignment with Maoist logics undermined 
his already tenuous legitimacy.350  Moreover, Hua made little effort 
at institutional entrepreneurship; he acted as a modest policy 
innovator within Maoist logics, but not entrepreneurially with 
respect to the logics themselves.351  As a product rather than a victim 
of these logics, Hua was evidently unable or unwilling to disembed 
himself from them.  The reformers, recognizing that public 
sentiment favored a paradigm shift, won the struggle for power 
through their prowess as institutional entrepreneurs.352  
In the ambiguity of the interregnum from 1976 to 1978, 
during which the Hua and Deng factions’ logics clashed, Hua’s 
incumbency was the more difficult position since a “somewhat 
contradictory image of change combined with continuity had to be 
conveyed.”353  This task could not be accomplished under Maoist 
logics, since ‘change’ in the context of the reformers’ emergent 
legitimization had come to mean abandoning Maoism. Hua and his 
predecessors had neglected the historical lesson that the reformers 
embraced as their governing thesis: though a political monopolist 
may appear to hold absolute power at any given moment, it must 
nevertheless work to legitimate and then to defend its logics, 
requiring constant adaptation and the ability to shape society’s 
adaptations; otherwise, credible competitors for power will 
emerge.354 
                                                            
349 See infra Part III.C. For more on the Maoists’ logics, see infra Part 
III.B.4. 
350 See MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 377 (discussing Hua’s fidelity 
to Maoist logics and resulting legitimacy problem). 
351 See MAURICE MEISNER, MAO’S CHINA AND AFTER: A HISTORY OF 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC 428 (3rd ed. 1999) (discussing Hua’s cautious attempt to 
abandon the policies of the late Maoist period and return to those of early 
Maoism). 
352 HARDING, supra note 339, at 39; accord WALDER, supra note 39, at 
343. 
353 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 371. 
354 This reflects the fact that the meanings, significance and desirability 
of particular institutions are always intrinsically contestable, and that an 
institution’s existence signals an invitation to stakeholders to contest the 
institution for their own self-interests. As such, the threat of the institutions’ 
displacement—and with them, the incumbent’s—is always real. One means to 
combat this threat is through institutional design: flexibility enables elites to 
55
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Moreover, as the incumbent, Hua was blamed for the 
conditions underlying society’s discontent. This burden of 
incumbency was well-understood by the reformers but not by Hua. 
His status quo response was similar to the Qing government’s 
resistance to change, which had made China susceptible to foreign 
powers while rendering the Qing’s legitimacy vulnerable to the 
institutional entrepreneurs represented by the Nationalists.355 Yuan 
Shikai’s brief regime then collapsed reverting to discredited 
imperialist logics.356 Subsequently, the Nationalists witnessed their 
legitimacy crumble as they took the blame for the problems of their 
era, vitiating them against the institutional entrepreneurial efforts of 
the CCP.357 And the consequences of the Maoists’ policies had left 
their logics susceptible to displacement once Mao himself was 
gone.358 Hua now found himself vulnerable—on account of his 
incumbency, frail legitimacy, and imploding logics—to the 
institutional entrepreneurs led by Deng. As the reformers’ logics 
gained traction,359 Hua “would discover that position conferred 
prestige and privilege, but power had deeper roots.”360 
The Qing, Yuan Shikai, the Nationalists, the Maoists and 
Hua Guofeng—each had failed when the burdens of incumbency 
eroded their legitimacy, leaving them vulnerable to actors more 
agile in institutional entrepreneurship.361  It is in this historical 
context that the CCP’s reform leaders designed the country’s new 
legal order. Scholars attribute to the reformers a strong desire to 
avoid another Cultural Revolution.362  But the reformers desired 
more—they sought an institutional reality that would stabilize their 
                                                            
‘referee’ institutional contests with a minimal corresponding ‘cost’ to the elites’ 
legitimacy. See infra Part III.C. 
355 See supra Part III.B.1. 
356 See supra Part III.B.2. 
357 See supra Part III.B.2. 
358 See supra Part III.B.3. 
359 See MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 378 (noting that Deng mobilized 
elite opinion through the press, and this was likely crucial to his victory over Hua). 
360 Id. at 371. 
361 See infra Figure 3. This is not to discount the role of the military, but 
rather highlights the vital support that institutional entrepreneurship contributed 
to the CCP’s military successes. 
362 See infra notes 420–25 and accompanying text. 
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incumbency without restraining it—to imbue the CCP permanently 
not only with the prerogative but with the imperative of 
entrepreneurial adaptability.  The reformers sought to avoid 
becoming vulnerable to more adept institutional entrepreneurs, as 
their predecessors had been.  A system of flexible formal legality 
would be their principal tool of choice. 
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In sum, the highly uncertain environment following Mao’s 
death led to a power struggle the outcome of which belonged to the 
faction championing the more compelling set of institutional 
logics.363  In this particular confluence of history and emergence, 
power was grounded in one’s agility as an institutional 
entrepreneur—a role at which the reformers excelled.364  Mao had 
attempted institutional entrepreneurship, even in the Cultural 
Revolution, the goal of which was “to change the nature of the 
Chinese people.”365  Ironically, Mao’s opportunism ensured the 
Party’s adaptability through experimentation, even after the Party 
had repudiated Maoism generally.366  The reformers would retain 
Mao’s institutionalization of experimentation as a core Party 
logic,367 but the overall results of Mao’s efforts were far more 
destructive than creative, and left the CCP’s legitimacy in 
shambles.368  The competing logics of the Maoists and the Deng 
reformers are summarized in Figure 4.369 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
363 See Battilana et al., supra note 71, at 82 (noting that institutional 
entrepreneurs advance new institutional logics or modify, defend, or destroy old 
ones). 
364 The reformers wielded their ideas as weapons. See Leonard 
Seabrooke, Transnational Institutions and International Regimes, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 253, 263 (2010) 
(discussing the use of ideas as weapons); MARK BLYTH, GREAT 
TRANSFORMATIONS 45 (2002) (characterizing ideas as “profoundly important 
political resources”). 
365 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 305. 
366 ORVILLE SCHELL & JOHN DELURY, WEALTH AND POWER: CHINA’S 
LONG MARCH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 392 (2013). 
367 Experimentation enabled by flexibility remains central to PRC law. 
Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and 
Development, 49 J. ECON. LIT. 1076, 1111 (2011). 
368 See infra Part III.C. 
369 See supra Part I (defining institutional logics).  
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The reformers emerged victorious at the Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee in December 1978.370  Like Hua, Deng 
realized that the Party’s legitimacy (and his own) depended upon 
repudiating the Cultural Revolution without delegitimizing Mao,371 
leading to the trial and conviction of the Gang of Four.372 
In 1981, the CCP issued a formal revisionist statement of its 
own history.373  The resolution declared Mao mostly a success (but 
also acknowledged his failures) and positioned Deng as the 
paramount leader.374  With their version of history secured, the 
reformers then turned to reshape China in a pragmatic vein375 by 
institutionalizing their logics.376  The reformers enacted their 
changes aware that China’s own path dependence had enabled 
Mao’s excesses.377  Like most institutional entrepreneurs, the 
reformers were determined to change the status quo from which they 
had emerged.  The reformers’ legal system would confer some 
measure of permanence upon their logics378 at a time when the 
                                                            
370 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 377–82. 
371 Id. at 389–90. 
372 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 318–19. 
373 Id. at 319; see also MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 389–93. The 
Party has produced numerous official histories. PHILIP P. PAN, OUT OF MAO’S 
SHADOW 85–86 (2008). 
374 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 320. History is a 
crucial strategic resource in Chinese culture, see LIU, supra note 93, at 135–40, 
so it is unsurprising that the reformers would seek to ensconce their version of 
events. “The Chinese people take history much more seriously than their Western 
counterparts,” LIU, supra note 93, at 136, and thus, history is a source of 
legitimacy in China. Accord Diana Lary, The Uses of the Past, in THE CHINESE 
PARTY-STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 130, 131 (André Laliberté & Marc Lanteigne 
eds., 2008). 
375 For example, Deng’s cooperation with the U.S. reflected his 
pragmatism. See WESTAD, supra note 274, at 373. 
376 This requires the proponent of the institutions to establish and 
maintain their meanings, which are always contestable. John L. Campbell, 
Institutional Reproduction and Change, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMP. 
INST. ANALYSIS 87, 105 (2010). 
377 In particular, the Party’s 1981 resolution asserted that “Chinese feudal 
autocracy” had allowed Mao to undermine the authority of law. MacFarquhar, 
supra note 339, at 392. 
378 See infra Part III.C. 
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PRC’s legal system was in need of dramatic reform.379  The legal 
reforms were intended to institutionalize an equilibrium between 
stability and adaptability, erring on the side of the flexibility needed 
to ensure the CCP’s authoritarian prerogative.380  By promulgating 
flexible law, the reformers sought to use path dependence to their 
advantage:381 future CCP leaders would be forced to attentively 
oversee the interface between Party and society, thereby 
necessitating the CCP’s ongoing role not merely as an institutional 
entrepreneur, but as the PRC’s paramount institutional 
entrepreneur.382 
The CCP and state were thus rebuilt.383  The reformers began 
constructing China’s contemporary legal system in the 1980s, in 
large measure to provide the stability needed for foreign 
investment.384  Although the reformers borrowed substantially from 
Western legal systems, they did not desire Western law 
institutionally.385  Thus, while post-Mao reforms signaled “an 
understanding that the unbridled power of the Party ultimately 
threatened everyone,”386 the state nevertheless remained immensely 
powerful.387  Senior CCP leaders continue to “stand constant guard 
against [any] encroachment on the Party’s power” that a Western 
                                                            
379 TANNER, supra note 226, at 551. 
380 See infra Part III.C. Stability refers to the public’s assent (even if 
passive) to the Party’s ongoing rule. See Benjamin L. Liebman, China’s Law and 
Stability Paradox, in CHINA’S CHALLENGES 157, 161–62 (Jacques deLisle & 
Avery Goldstein eds., 2015). 
381 See PIERSON, supra note 96, at 10–11 (discussing path dependence). 
382 See Hal Blanchard, Constitutional Revisionism in the PRC: “Seeking 
Truth from Facts,” 17 FLA. J. INT’L L. 365, 373–74 (2005) (noting some of the 
Party’s advantages in legal flexibility). 
383 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 393–401; DALI L. YANG, REMAKING 
THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN 65 (2004) (noting that the reformers’ downsizing of 
government was intended to make it more effective, and the Party more secure). 
384 SCHOPPA, supra note 232, at 370–71. 
385 See William Partlett & Eric C. Ip, Is Socialist Law Really Dead?, 48 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 463, 510–11 (2016) (warning that China’s increasing 
legal formality does not portend an institutional convergence with Western legal 
systems). 
386 MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 400. 
387 Id. The PRC state remained powerful for an additional reason: even 
private relationships such as contract depend upon state power. Lan, supra note 
8, at 383.  
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rule of law system would represent.388  This view has endured, most 
tragically reflected at Tiananmen Square, where the Party sent “a 
signal that still pulsates to this day: do not query the monopoly of 
the one-party state.”389  To the extent that the PRC’s legal 
institutions might imply self-restraint by the Party, it holds only so 
long as the Party believes that it can zealously protect its power.  The 
legal system is not viewed as an avenue to a democratic state, but as 
a means to legitimize and enhance the stability of the CCP as the 
source of all political power.390  While the formalism of this 
arrangement may represent a stronger rule of law than at any other 
time in China’s history, law is primarily used to defuse tensions,391  
maintain order, and sustain the CCP’s monopoly. 
 There are two important implications of the evolution of the 
PRC’s legal system as discussed above.  First, the reformers came 
to power with the realization that if they and the CCP were to 
survive, institutional entrepreneurship would be a vital feature of 
their governance.392  China’s prior rulers had either waited until 
conditions were bad to attempt institutional entrepreneurship 
(treating it as a discrete tool to be applied only selectively), or hardly 
attempted it at all.393  The reformers saw the need for institutional 
entrepreneurship as a tool to be applied continuously rather than 
intermittently.  China’s system of flexible legality reflects this 
                                                            
388 One senior leader asserted in 2007 that the PRC’s enemies “were 
trying to use the law to undermine and divide China.” MCGREGOR, supra note 
289, at 25; accord Liebman, China’s Law and Stability Paradox, supra note 380, 
at 173. “The correct political stand,” this member reiterated, “is where the Party 
stands.” MCGREGOR, supra note 289, at 25. 
389 THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, supra note 304, at 322; see also 
Lubman, supra note 37, at 77 (discussing the CCP’s unwillingness to place itself 
within the reach of the law). 
390 Legal and political reforms “were not meant as stepping-stones 
toward . . . multiparty democracy: the goal of reform was to preserve and enhance 
the stability of the single-party state.” TANNER, supra note 226, at 553; see also 
supra text accompanying note 37. 
391 TANNER, supra note 226, at 568. 
392 Indeed, the Party’s “continued . . . rule derives from [its] successful 
adaptation to changing economic and social conditions.” TERESA WRIGHT, 
ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM: STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS IN CHINA’S 
REFORM ERA 26 (2010) [hereinafter ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM]. 
393 See supra Figure 3.  
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realization.  Second, history provides practical insights for MNCs 
doing business in China today.  While the PRC’s legal system 
emerged out of the CCP’s self-interested effort to conserve its 
legitimacy and role as institutional entrepreneur, that very system 
now affords MNCs with the opportunity, if not the imperative, to 
engage in legal entrepreneurship.  The flexibility of the PRC’s legal 
system supplies a conducive context for doing so.394 
The next section concludes the analysis of why the PRC’s 
legal system is so flexible by examining the nearly insurmountable 
tensions that the reformers had to accommodate through 
institutional design. 
C. History, Strategy, and the Logic of Chinese Law: CCP as 
Institutional Entrepreneur 
By the early 1980’s, the CCP’s Fundamental Dilemma was 
apparent: how to establish the requisite stability for economic 
growth, thereby making China strong internationally, without 
sacrificing the Party’s legitimacy or strength domestically.  
Whatever the solution, it would have to account for potential 
challengers to the CCP’s monopoly, spectacular pressures on the 
CCP’s legitimacy, and the trade-off between the economic need for 
predictability and the CCP’s need for discretion.395  The reformers 
were thus faced with a seemingly intractable dilemma with no 
obvious solutions.  Yet the Party has devised a solution—through 
legal flexibility—and this solution is working,396 at least for now. 
 For most American observers, “[t]he primary Chinese 
motivation for undertaking legal reform . . . is economic,” but it is 
clear to both U.S. government officials and non-governmental 
experts that China’s “leadership wants to prevent reforms from 
seeping into the political sphere, and does not want any reforms that 
would undermine the central leadership’s decision-making 
                                                            
394 See infra Part V. 
395 See RONALD C. KEITH, CHINA’S STRUGGLE FOR THE RULE OF LAW 21 
(1994) (discussing the necessity of predictability and unity within the law). 
396 The CCP “survives because both the elites and the people perceive it 
as successful.” Ivan Krastev, Paradoxes of the New Authoritarianism, 22 J. 
DEMOCRACY 5, 8 (2011).  
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authority.”397  Flexible law facilitates economic reform without the 
need for substantial political reforms, and the analysis above 
suggests that while economic liberalization was clearly one of the 
reformers’ major goals, their top priority was the preservation of the 
CCP’s power.398  Economic reforms were pursued because a rising 
standard of living was the factor most likely to repair the CCP’s 
legitimacy after Mao.399  Hence, the typical assumption—that 
China’s legal reforms were intended simply to spur economic 
growth—greatly oversimplifies the CCP’s actual motives.  The 
implementation of economic and legal reforms does not explain the 
flexibility of the PRC’s legal system when certainty and 
predictability (that is, the objective and transparent application of 
formal rules) are considered the accepted model for stable economic 
growth.400 Had the top priority been simply to grow the economy, 
the Party would have attempted a legal system affording maximum 
predictability and the minimization of transaction costs.401 The 
analysis above reveals a more complex set of motives in which the 
CCP intended not merely to reform the PRC economy, but to do so 
                                                            
397 Matthew C. Stephenson, A Trojan Horse Behind Chinese Walls? 
Problems and Prospects of U.S.-Sponsored ‘Rule of Law’ Reform Projects in the 
People’s Republic of China, 18 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 64, 77 (2000). 
398 Economic expansion alone hardly guarantees the Party’s success. 
Zhengxu Wang, Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes, in LEGITIMACY: 
AMBIGUITIES OF POLITICAL SUCCESS OR FAILURE IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 
113, 138 (Lynn White ed., 2005). 
399 Mao’s ideological and charismatic authority enabled him to 
circumvent the historical lesson that his successors could not: a ruler’s legitimacy 
is generally tied to its delivery of public goods and promotion of the public 
welfare. VON GLAHN, supra note 232, at 85, 398–99. 
400 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, POLITICAL ORDER AND POLITICAL DECAY: 
FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO THE GLOBALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY 
371 (2014) (noting that most China observers have focused on economic reforms 
while neglecting political institutions). 
401 Clearly, the CCP has not opted for a legal system of maximum 
predictability. See, e.g., Katherine R. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections 
as Substitutes for Formal Institutional Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1643 
(1996) (noting that China’s “institutional instability . . . make[s] market exchanges 
uncertain and costly”); see also supra Part III.A. 
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on its own terms.402  “Dictators are inherently insecure,”403 and 
flexible law can help to promote the dictator’s stability while still 
allowing for the private economic activity that finances the 
dictator’s government.404  Western expectations that other 
stakeholders’ interests will independently drive legal reform in 
China are misplaced.405 
Legitimacy lends itself to abstractions, but its actual 
manifestation is vitally important to political actors. Professor 
Lipset states “most sociologists would agree that stable authority is 
power plus legitimacy.”406  As discussed previously, the CCP’s 
purity of ideology had sustained its legitimacy for most of Mao’s 
rule, but its destructive record eventually eroded its credibility.407  
By the end of Mao’s reign, it appeared as though the CCP was 
careening toward the same fate as its predecessors.408  To prevent 
the Party’s own self-destruction, the reformers created institutions 
that could accommodate an array of conflicting demands,409 
institutionalizing the flexibility essential to the CCP’s ongoing 
                                                            
402 Hence, China’s legal formalization does not yield “increasing 
autonomy from the dictates of party policy.” Biddulph, supra note 157, at 224. 
403 Stephen Haber, Authoritarian Government, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF POL. ECONOMY 693, 694 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. 
Wittman eds., 2006). 
404 See id. at 698–99 (noting that a lack of property rights undercuts an 
authoritarian by depriving it of a reliable tax base). 
405 China’s legal institutions are accomplishing exactly what they were 
designed to do. Dillon, supra note 158, at 186; Benjamin L. Liebman, Essay, 
Malpractice Mobs: Medical Dispute Resolution in China, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 
181, 244–45 (2013). 
406 SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN: THE SOCIAL BASES OF 
POLITICS 22 (1963) (emphasis added). 
407 See supra Part III.B. Still, ideology does impact the Party’s 
legitimacy. See Bruce Gilley & Heike Holbig, The Debate on Party Legitimacy 
in China: A Mixed Quantitative/Qualitative Analysis, 18 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 339 
(2009). 
408 See supra Figure 3 (summarizing China’s modern rulers and their 
respective fates). 
409 China’s formal law has accommodated myriad informal institutions. 
Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 
42 STAN. J. INT’L L. 103 (2006); Mary Szto, Strengthening the Rule of Virtue and 
Finding Chinese Law in “Other” Places: Gods, Kin, Guilds, and Gifts, 35 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1 (2012). 
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entrepreneurship without ossifying the institutions themselves.  The 
CCP’s mechanism for accomplishing these ambitious goals would 
be its flexible legal regime—an immensely adaptive system 
distinctively resistant to institutionalization, designed to ensure the 
CCP’s primacy amongst China’s institutional entrepreneurs even 
while tolerating power outside of the Party.  
The reformers’ rationale for formal law was straightforward.  
Deng and the reformers harbored a deep psychological need to 
restore the PRC’s strength internationally—an imperative long 
shared by the Chinese public.410  So long as the PRC’s sovereignty 
was tenuous,411 the CCP’s legitimacy would remain vulnerable to 
attack.412  The reformers also understood that affluence was key to 
restoring the PRC’s strength413—only a freer market could finance 
a government strong enough to enforce China’s territorial and 
economic integrity.414  In turn, however, the PRC’s development 
                                                            
410 R. Lufrano, Yan Jiaqi: “How China Can Become Prosperous”, in 2 
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 523, 524 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt 
eds., 1992) (noting that “the question of how China is to achieve wealth and power 
goes back to the self-strengthening movement of the 1860s . . .”); see also supra 
Part III.B; DREYER, supra note 36, at 6; Heilmann & Schulte-Kulkman, supra 
note 178, at 641; Kaufman, supra note 218, at 2; Peerenboom, supra note 218, at 
654–55. 
411 While China was under no immediate threat at this time, many elites 
then, like today, perceived that the PRC’s autonomy and very existence were 
threatened by a “world order dominated by ‘hegemonic’ Western powers . . . .” 
EDWARD VICKERS & ZENG XIADONG, EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN POST-MAO 
CHINA 324 (2017). 
412 The Communists themselves had gained traction in the civil war by 
convincing the public that the Nationalists were responsible for China’s baleful 
state. See e.g., DREYER, supra note 36, at 82–84; CHIANG KAI SHEK, supra note 
276, at 348–49, 484–86 (2003); ROBERTS, supra note 263, at 412. 
413 Peerenboom, supra note 218, at 654–56 (observing that the reformers’ 
focus has been “economic development and political stability”). “Political 
stability” here refers to the preservation of the CCP’s political monopoly. See 
supra text accompanying note 37.   
414 The goals of development and order are central to all states. Nasra & 
Dacin, supra note 96, at 586–87. Rulers must have an effective tax system to fund 
their military and other public goods. Donald F. Kettl, Public Bureaucracies, in 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS 366, 367 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. 
eds., 2006). Western powers had dramatically weakened the Chinese 
government’s financial base during the Century of Humiliation, see VON GLAHN, 
supra note 232, at 397, so the voluntary re-introduction of foreign economic 
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would depend, at least initially, upon foreign investment—and a 
reasonably stable legal system was a prerequisite to attracting such 
investment.415  Before the PRC’s standing could be strengthened 
internationally,416 a private marketplace and salutary legal system 
were needed domestically.417  The twin goals of political stability 
and economic growth required the exercise of institutional 
entrepreneurship to provide the proper context for their 
achievement.418  Thus, institutional entrepreneurship in legal reform 
became central to the CCP’s survival.419  The goals of stability and 
growth, informed by the need for foreign capital, favored a stable 
and predictable legal order. 
                                                            
actors was a sensitive issue for the reformers. The Qing had even recognized 
“commercial warfare” as key to reclaiming China’s sovereignty, VON GLAHN, 
supra note 232, at 378, and viewed the economy strategically, Jane Kate Leonard, 
The State’s Resources and the People’s Livelihood (Guoji Minsheng): The 
Daoguang Emperor’s Dilemmas about Grand Canal Restoration, 1825, in TO 
ACHIEVE SECURITY AND WEALTH  47, 50–51 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt 
eds., 1992). 
415 Li, supra note 172, at 73; see also Perry Keller, Sources of Order in 
Chinese Law, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 717 (1994). Clearly, China’s law has been 
stable enough to attract foreign investment in the reform era. Some scholars 
attribute foreign capital to saving the Party’s monopoly. See, e.g., Mary E. 
Gallagher, “Reform and Openness,” 54 WORLD POL. 338, 372 (2002). 
416 Flora Sapio, The Invisible Hand of Government: The Conceptual 
Origins of Social Management Innovation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW AND 
STABILITY IN CHINA 244–45 (Susan Trevaskes et al. eds., 2014). 
417 An authoritarian “government’s imperative is sustaining state power. 
Economics and markets are tools to do so.” JOHN D. DANIELS ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 98 (14th ed. 2013). 
418 See Zhu, supra note 145, at 429; Bruce Gilley, Legitimacy and 
Institutional Change: The Case of China, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 260 (2008) 
(linking institutions and legitimacy). Mao had “failed to deliver on the long-
standing promise of all Chinese revolutionaries since the early twentieth 
century—building a prosperous China strong enough to protect its national 
interests in a dangerous world.” Jacques deLisle & Avery Goldstein, China’s 
Challenges: Reform Era Legacies and the Road Ahead, in CHINA’S CHALLENGES 
1, 3–4 (Jacques deLisle & Avery Goldstein eds., 2105). Today’s Party claims 
credit for ending the Century of Humiliation as part of its legitimacy. WANG, 
supra note 218, at 127–29. 
419 Many scholars argue that China’s capitalism has reinforced rather 
than eroded its political system. See, e.g., ACCEPTING AUTHORITARIANISM, supra 
note 392, at 22–23. 
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The PRC’s internal traumas supplied the reformers with at 
least three additional reasons to favor a stable, formal legal system.  
First, so ineffectual was the PRC’s initial law that Mao had 
encountered virtually no institutional resistance to a war against his 
rivals within the CCP.420  Legal order might discourage political 
instability.421  Moreover, the Party’s survival would require the 
peaceful resolution of intra-Party strife, particularly as new factions 
were invited into the fold.422  Factional monopolies require 
particularly strong institutions.423  The reformers recognized this 
reality:424 the right legal system would promote the CCP’s durability 
from within.425 
Second, the reformers understood the market imperative for 
law.  Economic development was needed to finance the PRC’s 
strength.  Therefore, a new legal system was needed to maintain 
order and foster economic incentives,426 and would also, conversely, 
                                                            
420 TANNER, supra note 226, at 550–51 (“Many senior Party officials and 
their families had endured terrible personal suffering during the Cultural 
Revolution.”). 
421 Keller, supra note 415, at 713; accord YANG FENGCHUN, CHINESE 
GOVERNMENT 61 (2004). 
422 Factions pervade the Party. See Ben Hillman, Factions and Spoils: 
Examining Political Behavior within the Local State in China, 64 CHINA J. 1, 3 
n.9 (2010) (listing major scholarly works addressing CCP factionalism); see 
generally Victor Shih et al., Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining 
the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China, 106 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 166 (2012) (arguing, inter alia, that factional ties drive promotions in the 
PRC bureaucracy). 
423 See DOUGLASS C. NORTH ET AL., VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL ORDERS: A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING RECORDED HUMAN HISTORY 155 
(2009) (noting the value for political incumbents of laws that can be enforced 
across sundry power dynamics). 
424 See MILAN W. SVOLIK, THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 92–
117 (2012) (arguing that authoritarians can benefit from institutionalizing the 
rules of power-sharing among elites and showing that China’s reformers did this 
to prevent another Maoist personality cult). “[B]y being less likely destabilizing 
from within, regimes that institutionalize power-sharing may be even more 
successful at confronting mass challenges.” Id. at 117. 
425 See RONALD COASE & NING WANG, HOW CHINA BECAME 
CAPITALIST 101–02 (2012) (noting that the reformers’ legal system was intended 
to prevent another personality cult). 
426 Wang, supra note 327, at 12 (observing that the reformers viewed the 
law as a necessary means to maintain economic development); CHEN, supra note 
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facilitate social order through economic growth.427  The CCP would 
not adopt Western models wholesale, but would instead develop 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics”428—that is, growth 
commensurate with the CCP’s continuing rule.429 
 Third, as noted above, the CCP was facing a legitimacy crisis 
when Deng took power, and the reformers were acutely aware of 
this.430 Mao’s reign yielded extreme hardship for most citizens.431 
As pragmatists, the reformers realized that “[l]egitimacy is at the 
basis of power”432—that“[e]ven communist and authoritarian single 
                                                            
152, at 97 (noting that reforms are “aimed at creating a stable social order for 
smooth economic development”); DREYER, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that Deng 
supported the introduction of “the rule of law” but that “[h]is rationale . . .  was 
less civil libertarian than a result of his belief that a legal system was necessary to 
resolve disputes . . . before the wheels of production could turn smoothly”). 
427 Susan Trevaskes et al., Framing the Stability Imperative, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW AND STABILITY IN CHINA 268, 272–73 (Susan Trevaskes et al. 
eds., 2014); YUEH, supra note 6, at 9–13. 
428 DREYER, supra note 36, at 5–6 (noting that while no definitive 
definition of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” has been established, it 
includes the ability to increase one’s wealth, which in turn requires some degree 
of individual freedom and incentive). 
429 See supra text accompanying note 37 (noting the assumption that the 
CCP’s top priority is its own survival as a political monopoly). 
430 FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 1; accord THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, 
supra note 304, at 321; MACFARQUHAR & SCHOENHALS, supra note 315, at 1–3; 
see also YICHING WU, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: CHINESE 
SOCIALISM IN CRISIS 219 (2014) (arguing that China’s legal system represents 
both a developmental strategy and a “response . . . to continuously developing 
crises”). 
431 See, e.g., Victims, in CHINESE CIVILIZATION: A SOURCEBOOK 458–69 
(Patricia Buckley Ebrey ed., 1993) (recounting one family’s experiences); see 
also HUANG, supra note 23, at 23–24. “The evident political bankruptcy of the 
[Maoist] leadership . . . allowed a resurgence of [the reform factions, who 
prioritized] economic development over social transformation.” Charles Burton, 
China’s Post-Mao Transition: The Role of the Party and Ideology in the “New 
Period,” 60 PAC. AFF. 431, 431 (1987). The Maoists had failed to meet society’s 
expectations. Id. at 435. Reform policies would “in large part [be] a response to 
the ‘crisis of faith’ in Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought which 
became a widespread phenomenon.” Id.; see also Cohen, supra note 155, at 423–
24. 
432 Li, supra note 1, at 49; accord Gilley, supra note 418, at 269. 
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party-states require popular legitimacy to sustain their rule.”433  Mao 
“left China in a quiet crisis”—in such a bad state that he unwittingly 
“gave his successors the opportunity for a new start.”434  The 
reformers saw the implementation of a flexible legal system as a sort 
of pressure release valve,435 allowing the Party to address demands 
for justice, without committing to a uniform response that would 
constrain the CCP’s future options.436 
Among other benefits, such as legitimizing power, formal 
law enabled the CCP to be more responsive to the public.437 Hence, 
the reformers began consciously using formal law as a means to 
promote the CCP’s legitimacy.438  The reformers set out to establish 
a new political culture—stable yet flexible, accommodating of 
private interests but with the CCP firmly ensconced.439  Under Mao, 
officials attempted to discredit every other conceivable source of 
authority (including China’s history and traditions) in an effort to 
                                                            
433 DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND 
ADAPTATION 2–3 (2008); accord ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: 
UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 45 (2001). 
434 WALDER, supra note 39, at 341–42 (noting that the early reformers 
enjoyed an opportunity “outside the narrow limits of Maoist doctrine”). 
435 See Gallagher, supra note 415, at 372 (arguing that the CCP promotes 
law both to assert control over society and to stave off demands for 
democratization); Slater, supra note 165, at 140–41 (noting that the collapse of 
authoritarian states is usually punctuated since their institutions tend to be 
unresponsive to public pressures). 
436 See, e.g., Sida Liu, Beyond Global Convergence: Conflicts of 
Legitimacy in a Chinese Lower Court, 75 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 75 (2006) 
(showing how flexibility enables local PRC courts to maintain their legitimacy 
despite conflicting global institutional pressures). 
437 PARTY AND STATE, supra note 43, at 180; COASE & WANG, supra 
note 425, at 102 (arguing that formal legality protects the Party from reckless 
leaders and mass participation). 
438 Keith Hand, Resolving Constitutional Disputes in Contemporary 
China, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 51, 79–80 (2002); see generally Pitman B. Potter, 
Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in Post-Mao China, 138 CHINA 
Q. 325 (1994). 
439 This was crucial to the reformers because “[p]olitical legitimacy is 
conceptualized and contested through the medium of political culture.” MLADA 
BUKOVANSKY, LEGITIMACY AND POWER POLITICS: THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH 
REVOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL CULTURE 2 (2002); see also 
WENFANG TANG, POPULIST AUTHORITARIANISM: CHINESE POLITICAL CULTURE 
AND REGIME SUSTAINABILITY 2–5 (2016). 
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command citizens’ total loyalty.440  The reformers’ political culture 
became more complex.441  Establishing a new political culture is 
challenging.442  By the time the reformers took power, “[t]he 
instability of the legal framework cultivated a social cynicism 
toward law and order in China[.]”443  Still, some semblance of 
continuity was fabricated to facilitate reform.444  As a result, the 
CCP continued to wield total control based upon the fusion of 
cultural, economic and political power that enables today’s officials 
to defend their legitimacy within the broader institutional 
framework. 
                                                            
440 See, e.g., Mary Lynne Calkins, Censorship in Chinese Cinema, 21 
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 239, 271 n.170 (1999) (noting that during the 
Cultural Revolution, Mao “led a violent political assault on China’s cultural 
traditions …”); Bruce J. Dickson, The Survival Strategy of the Chinese 
Communist Party, 39 WASH. Q. 27, 37 (2016) (observing that “[w]hen the CCP 
first came to power in 1949, it was committed to eradicating Confucian 
traditions”); Erin E. Douglas, The Chinese Communist Party and Western Values 
Clash, 29 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 151, 162 (2001) (noting, in an example 
typical of the era, that Mao tested the loyalty of intellectuals during the Hundred 
Flowers Campaign); Orville Schell, China’s Cover-Up, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 
2018, at 22 (noting, inter alia, the CCP’s efforts to “‘rectify’ young people’s 
thinking” under Mao and its subsequent efforts to control the official historical 
record surrounding its existence); Mo Zhang, The Socialist Legal System with 
Chinese Characteristics: China’s Discourse for the Rule of Law and a Bitter 
Experience, 24 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1, 56–57 (2010) (stating, inter alia, that 
“[i]n Mao’s era, the obligation-based theme [that is, the Confucian expectation of 
loyalty] had become a political force”). 
441 FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 2. 
442 Id. Some Maoist logics were well-entrenched and resistant to change, 
even though many citizens welcomed political moderation and reform. See, e.g., 
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, What is Wrong with Being Red and 
Expert?, in CHINA SINCE 1919: REVOLUTION AND REFORM 214–15 (2004) 
(excerpting an article in which reformers countered the “Red but not expert” 
Maoist logic of the Cultural Revolution); see also MICHAEL DUTTON, POLICING 
CHINESE POLITICS: A HISTORY 263–64 (2005) (discussing the importance of 
formal law in the reformers’ creation of a new political culture). 
443 DING LU, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SUPPRESSED MARKETS: PRIVATE-
SECTOR EXPERIENCE IN CHINA 158 (1994). 
444 TANG, supra note 439, at 11–12; see also WU, supra note 430, at 220 
(“[B]y preempting popular challenges . . . [market reforms] posed less of a threat 
to the position of the ruling elite. All these measures were, after all, conducted 
within the calculated political limits of maintaining the existing structure of 
power.”). 
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 Threats to an authoritarian regime can arise from other elites, 
the public, and from foreign powers; and the incumbent’s response 
will depend upon the nature of the threat.445  The reformers 
inaugurated the creation of a private marketplace and the 
establishment of a Chinese rule of law in tandem.446  Today, the 
CCP’s survival strategy entails carrots in the form of economic 
opportunity and appeals to symbolic authorities (such as 
nationalism, the selective invocation of China’s traditional heritage, 
and co-optation), as well as sticks (the repression of perceived 
threats).447  The legal system implemented by the CCP was intended 
to serve (and in fact has served) the CCP’s strategy of buttressing a 
socialist rule of law, promoting the economy, and repairing the 
elites’ legitimacy.448 
This discussion illustrates why the reformers favored a 
formal legal system: to prevent another Maoist personality cult; 
provide a foundation for the economic growth that would finance 
the PRC’s restoration of its global status; and repair the CCP’s 
legitimacy by conditioning the rising affluence of everyday citizens 
upon its continuing rule.  Yet these factors do not explain the PRC’s 
high degree of legal flexibility, which is generally viewed as 
antithetical to such goals as stability and commerce.  More is needed 
to show why the CCP came to favor such a flexible formal legal 
system: we must also consider the most daunting challenges 
accompanying legal reform within the historical context established 
in Part III.B.449 
                                                            
445 BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL 
SURVIVAL 23 (2003). 
446 THE SEARCH, supra note 155, at 704. The reformers “saw legal reform 
. . . as a useful instrument not to promote democratic governance but to improve 
the means of Party control over society.” CHEN, supra note 152, at 169. Rapid 
economic change facilitates and mutually supports institutional adaptability. 
Frank K. Upham, From Demsetz to Deng: Speculations on the Implications of 
Chinese Growth for Law and Development Theory, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
551, 587–97 (2009). 
447 See, e.g., THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 145, at 2–3. 
448 See CHEN, supra note 152, at 156–58. 
449 China’s legal flexibilities enable controlled experiments to test ideas 
before implementing them widely. The reformers adopted a strategy—“take one 
step and then decide on the next step”—which “allows the CCP a high degree of 
political responsiveness” by “constantly . . .  readapt[ing] its governance . . . to 
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The reforms first prompted yet another legitimacy crisis, the 
irony of which was palpable. Radical socialism had failed450 and the 
CCP turned to capitalist reforms.  But as policies jettisoned pure 
socialism in favor of “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” little 
remained to distinguish the CCP from alternative political groups.451  
“If China’s ‘socialist cause’ were endangered, so too would be the 
legitimacy of the CCP’s national rule.”452  The shift from socialism 
to quasi-capitalism suffered from a “complete lack of reliance on 
any theoretical rationalization for the change.”453  Moreover, 
corruption pervaded the Communist bureaucracy in the 1980s.454 In 
denying these problems, the CCP’s continued use of socialist 
rhetoric confused the average citizen, who observed a largely free 
marketplace in daily life.455  The resulting dichotomy between 
rhetoric and reality further eroded the CCP’s credibility.456  Certain 
human factors associated with the transition, including 
incompetence, also undercut the CCP’s standing.457  And early in 
reform, most bureaucrats were still Maoists critical of the reformers’ 
agenda.458  Balance, pragmatism, and flexibility were essential to 
                                                            
meet . . . emerging demands.” Burton, supra note 431, at 445–46. This strategy is 
commensurate with the reformers’ realization of the need for a continuous 
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship. This incremental strategy 
“implicitly acknowledges no ideological ‘truths’ or preconceived political ends at 
all.” Id. at 445. 
450 See supra Part III.B.3. 
451 Burton, supra note 431, at 437. Mao had foreseen this dilemma. Id. 
In moving away from its ideological legitimacy, the Party instead embraced the 
“principles of nationalism, Chinese industry, and the ability of China to compete 
in the international economy.” Gallagher, supra note 415, at 371. 
452 Burton, supra note 431, at 437; accord WANG HUI, CHINA’S NEW 
ORDER 57–58 (2003). 
453 Burton, supra note 431, at 437; accord Lubman, supra note 37, at 80–
81; MEISNER, supra note 351, at 437. 
454 MEISNER, supra note 351, at 476. 
455 HUI, supra note 452, at 57. The reformers could not repudiate Mao 
altogether, and indeed, had to characterize Mao’s legacy with caution for the sake 
of the Party’s legitimacy. See HUANG, supra note 23, at 21; MEISNER, supra note 
351, at 439–46. 
456 SAICH, supra note 152, at 3. 
457 JOHN BRYAN STARR, UNDERSTANDING CHINA: A GUIDE TO CHINA’S 
ECONOMY, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL CULTURE 58 (2001). 
458 See DREYER, supra note 36, at 112–20. 
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the reformers’ efforts as they struggled to reconcile formal law with 
authoritarian rule.459 
 The second major challenge that a formal legal system posed 
was the law’s restrictive nature—not for society, but for the CCP 
itself.460  Irrespective of the particular policies it embodies, the law 
constrains government action.461  This seems counterintuitive for an 
authoritarian government; the CCP can change its policies at will.462  
                                                            
459 Balance has been institutionalized as part of China’s broader reforms. 
See David Shambaugh, The Chinese State in the Post-Mao Era, in THE MODERN 
CHINESE STATE 181 (David Shambaugh ed., 2000); see also BRUCE GILLEY, THE 
RIGHT TO RULE: HOW STATES WIN AND LOSE LEGITIMACY 25 (2009) (citing the 
CCP’s 2004 acknowledgment that its ruling status is not ensured and must be 
diligently managed). The Party also values flexibility because the goals of 
economic development and social order are not always consistent with one 
another. Xin Frank He, Sporadic Law Enforcement Campaigns as a Means of 
Social Control: A Case Study from a Rural-Urban Migrant Enclave in Beijing, 17 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 121, 138–39 (2003).  
460 Indeed, any institutionalization is constraining. FEWSMITH, supra note 
17, at 5. Even the “[i]nstitutionalization of state-society relations . . . binds the 
party-state . . . .” Id. at 12. 
461 The law and economics movement “perceives law as restraining the 
state and empowering private actors.” RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG 
MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 452–53 (2002). Ancient Chinese rulers 
recognized that public laws constrained their freedom to act. Qiang Fang & Roger 
Des Forges, Were Chinese Rulers Above the Law? Toward a Theory of the Rule 
of Law in China from Early Times to 1949 CE, 44 STAN. J. INT’L L. 101 (2008). 
The ancient Chinese correlated their leaders’ faithful observance of the laws with 
the leaders’ legitimacy; thus, a ruler’s downfall was often attributed to their 
disregard of the laws. Id.; see also FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 361 (noting that 
Chinese emperors were restrained by the bureaucracy and court rules); Huang 
Zongxi, Critique of the Chinese Dynastic System, in 2 SOURCES OF CHINESE 
TRADITION 4, 10–12 (Jane Kate Leonard & John R. Watt eds., 1992) (asserting 
that, in ancient China, “as [the laws] become tighter they become the very source 
of disorder”). Mao, too, was constrained—even by informal institutions—and this 
explains his attacks on traditional Chinese culture. See COASE & WANG, supra 
note 425, at 11. Local officials today also resent the constraints of law. STEPHEN 
K. MA, ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN POST-MAO CHINA: EFFICIENCY OR ETHICS 
123 (1996).  
462 The institutionalization of policy-making processes curtails the elites’ 
‘freedom of action’ in a second way, in addition to the legitimacy constraint. See 
HUANG, supra note 23, at 14–15. This helps to explain the Party’s use of 
campaigns today—to mitigate bureaucratic entrenchment. See Elizabeth J. Perry, 
From Mass Campaigns to Managed Campaigns: ‘Constructing a New Socialist 
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But even in an authoritarian system, publicly available laws function 
as a commitment by the state—a commitment that the government 
will act in a certain way under certain circumstances, and a 
commitment to use the state’s coercive power to compel compliance 
by others.463  The CCP’s legitimacy is invariably placed at issue 
when laws are disseminated openly.464  Public laws create public 
expectations, which are then measured against the state’s actual 
behavior.465  The CCP is thus conflicted, in some instances desiring 
innovation and in others, resisting it.466  
This Paper has argued that China’s flexible formal legality 
is one of the CCP’s key institutional mechanisms to balance these 
conflicting concerns.467  Like other authoritarians, the CCP must 
oppose the Western perspective of the rule of law,468 as it is 
incompatible with absolute state power.  More generally, 
authoritarians must oppose any institutions that might constrain their 
power, or else learn how to mitigate or manipulate such forces.  
Institutionalization endows the law with a life of its own,469 and the 
                                                            
Countryside,’ in MAO’S INVISIBLE HAND 30, 51 (Sebastian Heilmann & Elizabeth 
J. Perry eds., 2011). 
463 See Corne, supra note 7, at 375 (discussing the tradeoff between 
predictability for regulated actors and the Party’s flexibility to respond to social 
developments); accord Mary E. Gallagher, “Use the Law as Your Weapon!”, in 
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA 54, 76 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds., 2005); Glenn 
Morgan & Sigrid Quack, Law as a Governing Institution, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMP. INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 275, 276 (2010). 
464 Politicians’ “freedom of action has usually been constrained by 
concerns to preserve ‘legitimacy’ . . . .” Lawrence, supra note 123, at 224. 
465 Gallagher, supra note 463, at 76; Liebman, supra note 145, at 20–21; 
Curtis J. Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, The China Aviation Oil Episode: Law and 
Development in China and Singapore, in LAW AND ECONOMICS WITH CHINESE 
CHARACTERISTICS 329, 347–48 (David Kennedy & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2013). 
466 FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 15–16. 
467 For instance, the Party’s use of enforcement campaigns contains 
elements of both flexibility and legal rationality and ultimately promotes the goal 
of social control. See, e.g., Sarah Biddulph et al., Rule of Law with Chinese 
Characteristics: The Role of Campaigns in Lawmaking, 34 LAW & POL’Y 373 
(2012); He, supra note 459. 
468 See FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 11–12. 
469 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 465, at 346 (“Once enacted . . . law 
often takes on a life of its own as different agents begin to explore how it might 
advance their own interests.”). 
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reformers realized that in order to obtain some of the benefits of 
formal law while also preventing it from becoming entrenched and 
independent of the CCP, the law’s flexibility could act as the 
mitigating factor. 
The law’s constraining nature is also linked to the CCP’s 
legitimacy challenge. Even the CCP requires sufficient legitimacy—
and the cooperation of the governed—to maintain its position.470  
The Party voluntarily undercuts its own vitality when it ignores or 
contravenes the commitments embodied in its laws.471  This is 
precisely why the Maoists,472 and China’s imperial rulers,473 
                                                            
470 See JENNIFER GANDHI, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS UNDER 
DICTATORSHIP xvii–xviii (2008) (noting that authoritarians require legitimacy and 
the cooperation of the governed); accord Jean Blondel, About Institutions, Mainly, 
But Not Exclusively, Political, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POL. INSTITUTIONS  
716, 727 (R.A.W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006); Hand, supra note 438, at 102; Philip 
C.C. Huang, The Basis for the Legitimacy of the Chinese Political System: 
Whence and Whither? Dialogues Among Western and Chinese Scholars, VII – 
Editor’s Introduction, 40 MOD. CHINA 107, 107 (2014); WANG, supra note 130, 
at 5–7; see also THE DICTATOR’S DILEMMA, supra note 145, at 214–215 (noting 
that “the Party’s survival strategy has major impacts on [its] popular support”). 
471 Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Socialist Legal Theory in Deng Xiaoping’s 
China, 11 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 469, 481 (1997) (noting that while “[c]larity was 
sorely needed” in the 1982 Constitution from the societal perspective, “clarity was 
too dangerous [to the Party’s interests] and might impair [the Party’s] 
legitimacy”). 
472  “Some [in Mao’s era] believed that while laws were clearer and more 
precise after being written down, they also became more difficult to change.” Li, 
supra note 331, at 89. Mao’s generation viewed rules as roadblocks to continuous 
revolution. Id.; accord Donald C. Clarke, The Law, the State and Economic 
Reform, in THE CHINESE STATE IN THE ERA OF ECONOMIC REFORM 190 (Gordon 
White ed., 1991); Heilmann & Perry, supra note 335, at 14. Even Mao was 
constrained by the Party’s inertia until the Cultural Revolution. See DAVID 
BACHMAN, BUREAUCRACY, ECONOMY, AND LEADERSHIP IN CHINA 47, 237 
(1991).   
473  Ernest Caldwell, Social Change and Written Law in Early Chinese 
Legal Thought, 32 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2014) (noting concerns that written law 
would constrain elites); Wolfram Eberheard, The Political Function of Astronomy 
and Astronomers in Han China, in CHINESE THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS 15 
(John K. Fairbank ed., 1957) (showing how informal institutions limited the 
emperor’s power); Fang & Des Forges, supra note 461, at 106, 122 (noting that 
ancient authorities debated the tradeoffs of making laws public); S.E. FINER,  THE 
HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES: ANCIENT MONARCHIES 
AND EMPIRES 1303 (1997) (noting informal institutional constraints placed on the 
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despised publicly-available rules.  Mao foresaw what would occur 
with a formal and transparent set of laws: confronted by changing 
or unanticipated circumstances, the CCP would be forced to either 
(a) act contrary to its own commitments, thereby destroying its 
credibility in plain view of the public, or (b) act in accordance with 
the law, voluntarily restraining its range of motion and degrading its 
ability to control society.474 
 The constraining nature of formal law conflicted with the 
reformers’ desire for change. Although the reformers fostered some 
idea of the rule of law, a market economy, and individual economic 
incentives, they nevertheless remained communists.475  The 
reformers were as fervently committed as the Maoists had been to 
the maintenance of the CCP’s monopoly.476  Absolute power and the 
provision of market-based incentives have become binary in the 
PRC context.  Its power has enabled the CCP to create by fiat a 
market economy without the constraints of Western institutions.  
Instead of a Western rule of law, the CCP instituted a regime imbued 
with legal flexibility.  This allows the CCP’s evolving policies to be 
more easily integrated into laws and regulations, facilitated by their 
                                                            
emperor); LUBMAN, supra note 238, at 16–17 (noting  imperial constraints placed 
on the  emperor’s powers); Wang, supra note 327, at 3 (noting that legalist 
demands periodically resulted in the law’s dissemination). 
474 A third option is to use a legitimized, transparent lawmaking process 
to update the rules. But at least two complications make this possibility 
unappealing to the CCP. First, procedural formalities are time-consuming and 
stability in authoritarian states is often tenuous. Reactive laws seldom quell 
present uprisings. And second, an open, regular process could subject rule-making 
to a high degree of influence from actors outside of the Party, who might come to 
view their participation in rule-making as a right. 
475 “Deng Xiaoping . . . saw no incongruity between capitalist economic 
methods and the Stalinist political system over which he presided.” MEISNER, 
supra note 351, at 514–15. See also FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 363 (noting 
that the Party is not subordinated to law); MacFarquhar, supra note 339, at 383–
84 (noting that Deng Xiaoping shut down the 1978 Democracy Wall soon after 
appearing to endorse it); Brantly Womack, In Search of Democracy: Public 
Authority and Popular Power in China, in CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 53, 84 (Brantly Womack ed., 1991) (noting that Deng 
Xiaoping retreated on reforms when social forces began to challenge the Party). 
476 See Lubman, supra note 37, at 4; see also EZRA F. VOGEL, DENG 
XIAOPING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CHINA 251–65 (2011) (discussing the 
reformers’ desire to limit some freedoms even while expanding others). 
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very ambiguity.477 Still, this has put the Party in an uncomfortable 
position: the CCP has no intention of democratizing,478 yet it has 
had to promote citizens’ legal consciousness through a lengthy law 
dissemination campaign.479 
 The third critical challenge posed by formal law was 
enmeshed with the preceding two.  Once a society legitimizes 
private enterprise and allows some degree of affluence outside of the 
state’s immediate purview, it necessarily accepts some degree of 
influence outside of the state as well.  Though influence is not 
exclusively a function of money, history’s most indelible axiom 
endures, unmoved even by the most intensive Communist 
propaganda: power tends inextricably to follow wealth.480  It is 
simply not possible for the CCP to allow private wealth without a 
corresponding rise of potential competitors for power.481  To be 
sure, not all private interests will become actual competitors for 
power: some will discover a sufficient interest in the status quo, and 
the CCP thus proactively co-opts private interests through Party 
membership.482 Still, this strategy has its limits.483  It is 
extraordinary that the CCP voluntarily created the conditions for 
potential challengers to exist, since “[t]he first impulse of any 
                                                            
477 Xiao Li, Legal and Economic Development with Sui Generis Chinese 
Characteristics: A Systems Theorist’s Perspective, 39 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 159, 200 
(2014). 
478 WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE POLITICS IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING 
75–76 (2015). 
479 Young Nam Cho, Law Dissemination Campaign in China: The 
Origin of Chinese ‘Rule of Law’ Policy, 21 J. INT’L & AREA STUD. 27 (2014). 
480 See, e.g., ACEMOGLU & ROBINSON, supra note 20, at 16 (discussing 
the relationship between wealth and power in politics). Of course, power can 
beget wealth as well. 
481 Nearly all incumbents have rivals for power. BUENO DE MESQUITA ET 
AL., supra note 445, at 8, 16–18. As exclusionary arrangements, authoritarian 
states invariably create rivals. See generally Slater, supra note 165. 
482 WEALTH INTO POWER, supra note 233, at 66–100. 
483 For example, the Party competes with private employers for human 
capital. STARR, supra note 457, at 58. The empowerment of social groups is also 
witnessed in the rise of mass protests. See generally LI CHEN, SOCIAL PROTEST 
AND CONTENTIOUS AUTHORITARIANISM IN CHINA (2012). Thus, the CCP blurs 
the lines between state and society to prevent “the emergence of formal 
institutions that will constrain party power.” FEWSMITH, supra note 17, at 16. 
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organization . . . on the appearance of a serious competitor is to 
destroy competition.”484  The CCP’s embrace of such an 
environment is a testament to the dire circumstances prevailing after 
Mao, and to the reformers’ recognition that a private market was 
absolutely essential to finance China’s sovereignty.485  Most of all, 
however, this willingness was a testament to the CCP’s confidence 
that it could effectively check the power connoted in a private 
market.  Flexible legality empowers the CCP to tailor its responses 
to the inevitable institutional exigencies arising under the influence 
of foreign investment and with the legitimization of private wealth.  
In this way, the Party can allow private actors their economic 
pursuits and even some constructive latitude to influence the 
development of law while maintaining its own preeminence in 
institutional entrepreneurship. 
Democracies need not exhibit a zero-sum game between the 
nation’s strength internationally and the political incumbents’ 
strength domestically.  But in an authoritarian state, where one 
group monopolizes political authority at the exclusion of others, an 
unavoidable tension arises: the greater the amount of privately-held 
wealth, the stronger the PRC can be against the world—but also the 
more likely that affluent domestic actors might one day credibly 
challenge the CCP’s monopoly.486  The Party is mindful of the fact 
that private interests, backed by wealth, can compete for 
influence.487  Major instability has been avoided in the reform era, 
as its flexible legal system has helped the CCP to moderate the 
pressures to democratize inherent in the state’s dependence upon 
                                                            
484 Edward A. Ross, Institutional Competition, 25 J. SOC. 171, 171 
(1919). Indeed, “the accumulation of wealth by anyone not in an elite role poses 
a great temptation and a threat to the elite.” FRED W. RIGGS, ADMINISTRATION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 143 (1964) (emphasis omitted). 
485 See supra Parts III.B.4, III.C. 
486 See supra Part III.C. 
487 See FUKUYAMA, supra note 400, at 354–55, 375–76, 384; Kennedy 
& Stiglitz, supra note 160, at 490; see also supra notes 232, 287 and 
accompanying text (discussing guild power in the Qing and Republican eras 
respectively). 
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publicly-derived taxes.488  Legal flexibilities provide legitimate 
cover for the CCP to intervene and prevent any actor or coalition 
from becoming capable of challenging its authority, without 
upsetting the broader economic frameworks in place. 
 Alternatively stated, the mere existence of formal 
institutions also ensures the existence of rival institutional 
entrepreneurs.  The flexibility of China’s legal system allows 
regulated parties and lower-level officials to influence the meanings 
and effectiveness of these institutions.489  But higher-level officials 
can thereby allow for the reasonable adaptation of their policy 
preferences to local circumstances within their preferred 
boundaries.490 
 In sum, the PRC’s flexible formal legality allows the 
substance and enforcement of legal rules to shift constantly, 
entailing a high degree of dynamism.  But what does not change—
what cannot change—is the law’s underlying flexibility.  This 
reflects the CCP’s determination—having heeded the lessons of 
history491—to hold an ongoing competitive advantage in the 
competency of institutional entrepreneurship.  It is a continuous act 
of institutional entrepreneurship to preserve the legal 
superstructure’s flexibility, reinforced by the path dependent 
‘momentum’ that the flexible legal system now possesses—but 
opposed by those interests that would benefit economically from 
greater certainty and predictability.  The CCP’s effort to resist legal 
                                                            
488 See generally Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Alastair Smith, Political 
Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change, 42 COMP. LEGAL STUD. 167 
(2009). 
489 See generally LILY L. TSAI, supra note 194; KELLEE S. TSAI, supra 
note 194.  
490 See generally CORNE, supra note 159. The argument here—that the 
CCP benefits from high degrees of legal flexibility not only because it facilitates 
changes to policy but also because it forces the Party to strategically manage the 
law’s institutional framework—is consistent with John Campbell’s proposition 
that “[i]nnovations that best fit the prevailing institutional context will be more 
likely to result in evolutionary rather than revolutionary change than those that do 
not fit as well.” JOHN L. CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND 
GLOBALIZATION 181 (2004). The Party desires evolutionary change because it is 
easier to control, and because the CCP, more than any other interest, stands to lose 
from revolutionary change. See supra Part III.B. 
491 See supra Part III.B. 
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entrenchment is aided by the law’s very flexibility and amplifies its 
importance as a higher-order institutional feature.  The Party is most 
likely to fall not from an organized rebellion as in prior epochs of 
Chinese history, but rather from losing the battle for the ‘soul’ of the 
PRC’s formal institutions, or from irreparably disintegrating its 
legitimacy in maintaining control. 
 This Part has proceeded under the rubric of institutional 
theory, since the law is an institution subject to the principles of 
institutional design.492  Yet the discussion above makes clear that 
the PRC’s legal institutions represent a resource more so than an 
institution per se from the CCP’s perspective.  The PRC’s flexible 
legal system has been a central resource on which the CCP relies to 
ensure its ongoing dominance in institutional entrepreneurship, and 
it is thus a key resource in perpetuating the CCP’s survival. While it 
is beyond the scope of this Paper to consider how the resource-based 
view493 informs our assessment of why the Party embraced legal 
flexibility, it seems anecdotally apparent that the CCP has mimicked 
what firms can do: combining resources and institutions to achieve 
competitive advantage.494  The Party began with the question of 
what resource was needed to best secure its monopoly after Mao, 
and built institutions in response.  This is the opposite sequence of 
steps for firms’ institutional strategies (in the short-term, anyway): 
firms begin with the question of what institutions exist, and then 
determine how they can best be utilized as resources.495  While firms 
and the state might both find institutions at the center of their 
                                                            
492 See supra Part II. 
493 The resource-based view is another leading theory in international 
business and “posits that firms may obtain sustainable competitive advantage by 
focusing on strategies that leverage their internal resources to take advantage of 
environmental opportunities.” Robert C. Bird, Law, Strategy, and Competitive 
Advantage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 61, 65 (2011). 
494 See, e.g., Christine Oliver, Sustainable Competitive Advantage: 
Combining Institutional and Resource-Based Views, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 697 
(1997). The CCP’s competitive advantage has been its dominance in institutional 
entrepreneurship. 
495 See supra Part I. This is the subject of the LAS literature, of which 
legal entrepreneurship is a part. Of course, individual firms might in the longer-
term also seek to create, change, or destroy institutions, acting as institutional 
entrepreneurs as well. 
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respective strategies, they will often approach institutions and 
institutional design from opposite directions. 
 This analysis has served several purposes.  First, it explains 
why the CCP has opted for a flexible and inefficient legal design 
even as economic growth remains central to the CCP’s success.  A 
flexible legal system enables the CCP to balance its myriad 
competing goals and constraints; most crucially, it enables and 
encourages private economic activity while still empowering the 
CCP to check the potential competitors for power that invariably 
result from private affluence.  Its flexibility affords the Party 
maximum scope to act legitimately—that is, consistently with the 
commitments embodied in the law.  Flexible legality also supplies 
the Party-state, at all levels, with a framework in which the 
legitimacy of the state’s identity as institutional entrepreneur is 
continuous rather than ad hoc or intermittent.  While this may 
necessitate the resolution of regulatory events on a case-by-case 
basis (subject always to the ambits of CCP policy), the same 
flexibilities ensure that the CCP need not re-justify its role as 
institutional entrepreneur in exercising its power.  This enables the 
CCP to undertake specific acts of policy-making as “institutional 
work,” or “purposive actions that [create] . . . new institutional 
frameworks[.]”496  The legal institutions of the PRC coordinate 
interests, announce general policies, and enhance the credibility of 
rules497—hallmarks of any legal system.  Yet what really defines 
Chinese law is not its formal artifacts but rather the leadership of the 
CCP,498 and the strength of its approach to law “is not its coherence 
but its openness to unexpected and tentative policy solutions that are 
seized upon when they come up.”499  Flexible law, then, allows the 
                                                            
496 Nasra & Dacin, supra note 96, at 584. 
497 Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 465, at 330. 
498 TEEMU RUSKOLA, LEGAL ORIENTALISM  223–25 (2013) (noting that 
the ideological stakes of theorizing the rule of law are high and are thus taken 
seriously, and that China’s conflicting institutions ensure that the Party remains 
the true source of power); accord Jiang Shigong, Written and Unwritten 
Constitutions: A New Approach to the Study of Constitutional Government in 
China, 36 MOD. CHINA 12, 23 (2010). 
499 Sebastian Heilmann, Maximum Tinkering Under Uncertainty: 
Unorthodox Lessons from China, 35 MOD. CHINA 450, 453 (2009). 
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CCP to cope with the uncertainties of its own environment500 and is 
therefore likely to endure.501  The motivation for this approach, we 
have seen, was born of the reformers’ ability to interpret China’s 
recent history more skillfully than their predecessors: while formal 
law would be essential to the country’s global restoration, legal 
institutions could be made to serve the CCP’s domestic interests 
only if flexible enough to discourage and defeat the Party’s potential 
rivals for institutional authority. 
Second, the analysis illustrates the centrality of institutional 
entrepreneurship to the CCP’s stability and revealed the Party’s 
conscious recognition of the need to establish and maintain a 
competitive advantage in institutional entrepreneurship.  A system 
of flexible, formal legality retains this advantage for the CCP while 
minimizing the erosion of its legitimacy. 
Third, this analysis implies a limit to the degree of certainty 
and predictability that PRC law can achieve before it becomes 
politically destabilizing.502  Entrenched legal institutions would, by 
definition, be perilously independent of and immune to the CCP’s 
influence.  By promulgating a highly flexible law, the CCP 
disallows other actors from enacting a particular path dependent 
direction in the law without the Party’s consent. In the end, only one 
principle and one means remain entrenched in PRC law: the 
principle of the Party’s monopoly, and the flexible means by which 
it exerts its ongoing supremacy in institutional entrepreneurship.  
Viewed thusly, the CCP—for whom economic growth is extremely 
important—could rationally engineer legal institutions that are 
                                                            
500 Id. at 454; Heilmann & Perry, supra note 335, at 12. 
501 Heilmann, supra note 499, at 460; Lubman, supra note 37, at 4 
(discussing “rolling uncertainty” in the PRC legal system). 
502 Some observers predict that the Party will be forced to abandon legal 
flexibility on account of China’s international legal obligations. See, e.g., Richard 
Wu, The Changing Regime for Regulating Loans of State Owned Banks in China: 
Towards a System of Prudential Banking, 26 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 107, 139–41 
(2009). But this study extrapolated one small subset of Chinese law to the PRC 
legal system generally. This also underestimates the importance of flexibility to 
the Party’s survival, the CCP’s entrepreneurial dexterity, the rate at which new 
flexibilities are created, and the extent of flexibility in international legal 
institutions. See infra Part IV (discussing flexibility in international legal 
institutions). 
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economically suboptimal.  Razo observes that “[c]hoosing rules 
about rules (that is, meta-institutional choices) immediately invites 
the possibility of an infinite regress in which participants cannot 
readily agree on preferred institutions in a prior stage (and higher 
choice level).”503  But the choice of flexibility as the ‘meta-
institutional rule’ of PRC law has helped to unify the CCP’s factions 
in that legal flexibility provides a measure of security against losing 
the privileged positions that they share with one another. 
 With respect to LAS, this analysis has applied business 
constructs to the legal-historical context to show how states can 
approach law strategically.  The LAS literature has focused on law’s 
strategic value solely from the firm’s vantage.  However, a link 
between law and competitive advantage holds for states, too, in the 
state’s role as designer of legal institutions—that is, as institutional 
entrepreneur.  Political incumbents can design legal institutions as 
instruments of self-preservation.  The Paper makes a second related 
contribution to LAS. An MNC’s recognition of the Party’s 
entrepreneurial capacity is vital to firm-level strategy in China.  The 
PRC’s historical forces have shaped the institutional environment 
that now confronts MNCs in China.  Accordingly, the analysis here 
should inform the contextualization of MNCs’ non-market 
strategies in China today.504 
China’s approach clearly sacrifices the legal entrenchment 
that is fundamental to Western rule of law.505  But the first objective 
of the PRC legal system is not to ensure stability for those whom it 
regulates; its paramount goal is instead to advance the interests of 
the CCP.506  Yet while the flexibility of Chinese law is motivated by 
                                                            
503 Armando Razo, Strategic Embeddedness and the Microfoundations 
of Collective Action: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Rule of Law and 
Informal Institutions in Cooperation Games, 28 J. THEOR. POL. 105, 107 (2016). 
504 See infra Part V. 
505 See generally Michael D. Gilbert, Entrenchment, Incrementalism, 
and Constitutional Collapse, 103 VA. L. REV. 631 (2017). 
506 This stands in obvious contrast to American legal thought, in which 
law is often understood through its “social purpose.” Justin Desautels-Stein, A 
Context for Legal History, or, This Is Not Your Father’s Contextualism, 56 AM. 
J. LEGAL HIST. 29, 32 (2016). Differing assumptions concerning law and its 
societal role help to explain the Western view that the flexibilities and 
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the CCP’s self-interest, this does not mean—as is often assumed in 
the West—that the effects of China’s legal uncertainties are entirely 
negative.  The CCP cannot capture the benefits of legal flexibility 
for itself without also creating opportunities for firms to likewise 
engage those flexibilities to their ends.507  Understanding the 
implications of this context is essential to the legal strategies of 
MNCs in China today.508 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
We have seen how the CCP strategically engineered a formal 
legal system rife with flexibilities to promote its myriad interests—
especially to preserve its dominance in, and continuous exercise of, 
institutional entrepreneurship.509  It is worth noting here that 
governments similarly create and utilize legal flexibilities in the 
global context.510  Cross-jurisdictional legal rules are bound to be 
uncertain because international institutions must accommodate “the 
two poles of sovereignty and community”511 and because 
“[p]owerful states delegate authority to international institutions, but 
they do so in ways that allow them to retain substantial degrees of 
control.”512 
                                                            
uncertainties of PRC law are exclusively negative. See supra Part I (noting this 
view). 
507 See supra Part I. 
508 See infra Part V (discussing the need for further research on how 
MNCs can best strategically account for the PRC’s legal flexibilities in light of 
the historical context discussed here). 
509 See supra Part III. 
510 For a helpful overview work, see generally Oliver Kessler, The Same 
as it Never Was? Uncertainty and the Changing Contours of International Law, 
37 REV. INT’L STUD. 2163 (2011) (discussing the implications of uncertainty and 
risk in a post-national international law regime). 
511 JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL LAW 5 (2nd ed. 2009). 
512 Randall W. Stone, Institutions, Power, and Interdependence, in 
POWER, INTERDEPENDENCE, AND NONSTATE ACTORS IN WORLD POLITICS 31, 48 
(Helen V. Milner & Andrew Moravcsik eds., 2009). Customary international law, 
which one might equate to informal (uncodified) norms, is also characterized by 
high degrees of uncertainty. See, e.g., Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in the 
Formal Sources of International Law: Customary International Law and Some of 
Its Problems, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 523 (2004). 
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 States deliberately build flexibility into their agreements 
with one another.513  Ambiguities can help to facilitate the resolution 
of conflicts, accommodate evolving circumstances without the need 
to renegotiate treaties, afford states greater latitude to respond to 
crises, and in some cases can have a greater deterrence than certain 
predefined sanctioning.514  Treaties are often reinterpreted over time 
so as to change their meanings.515  The rules governing international 
organizations can of course be formally amended by the constituent 
member states, but can also change through informal means.516  
International rules that strategically combine certainty and 
flexibility can balance the incentives of private actors to engage in 
global commerce with states’ needs to sometimes deviate from 
rules.517  Regional trade agreements can also be designed flexibly to 
promote cooperation and other objectives.518  Sound monetary 
institutions, for instance, will make credible commitments but will 
                                                            
513 TRIPS provides a high profile example. See generally Henning 
Grosse Ruse-Khan, The International Law Relation Between TRIPS and 
Subsequent TRIPS-Plus Free Trade Agreements: Towards Safeguarding TRIPS 
Flexibilities?, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 325 (2011) (arguing that conflicts rules in 
TRIPS-plus free trade agreements can themselves be interpreted creatively to 
achieve a similar policy space to that offered by the TRIPS flexibilities with 
respect to implementing free trade obligations in intellectual property). 
514 Itay Fischhendler, When Ambiguity in Treaty Design Becomes 
Destructive: A Study of Transboundary Water, 8 GLOBAL ENVTL POL. 111, 111–
12 (2008). Of course, there are also negative tradeoffs in the use of ambiguities. 
Id. 
515 See generally Julian Arato, Subsequent Practice and Evolutive 
Interpretation: Techniques of Treaty Interpretation Over Time and Their Diverse 
Consequences, 9 LAW & PRAC. INT’L COURTS & TRIBS. 9 (2010). 
516 Julian Arato, Treaty Interpretation and Constitutional 
Transformation: Informal Change in International Organizations, 38 YALE INT’L 
L.J. 289 (2013) (arguing that one key means of informal change is through the 
international organization’s judicial organ reinterpreting its constitutional 
document). 
517 See, e.g., Stefan M. Miller, Parallel Imports: Towards a Flexible 
Uniform International Rule, 15 J. COM. BIOTECH. 21 (2009) (advocating for a 
flexible system of international exhaustion concerning parallel imports in the 
intellectual property context). 
518 The African Regional Trade Agreements do just this. See James Thuo 
Gathii, African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes, 35 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 571 (2010). 
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also flexibly accommodate uncertainties.519  Flexibility is hailed as 
a key positive feature in transgovernmental networks, which enable 
government regulators to work with their foreign counterparts on 
global problems requiring regulation across countries.520  
Flexibilities in international institutions can extend so far as to allow 
countries to escape their agreed-upon obligations.521  Much like this 
Paper has argued that the PRC’s legal flexibilities benefit the CCP, 
“safeguard clauses” allowing countries to exit international 
institutions likewise reflect the countries’ self-interested 
behavior.522 
 One interesting question is whether the PRC will hold an 
advantage in influencing or creating international legal institutions, 
given its experiences with legal flexibility domestically.  The PRC 
has an incentive, like any country, to promote its interests globally.  
And in China’s case, Joseph Fewsmith has suggested that “[t]he 
apparent tension between globalization and domestic challenges” 
implies that the PRC will face difficulties in the future as it 
reconciles its domestic institutions with global ones,523 affording the 
CCP an additional incentive to shape global rules.  As the CCP’s 
embrace of domestic legal flexibility signaled its confidence that it 
could allow for potential competitors while preventing them from 
becoming too powerful, so may China’s engagement with 
international institutions portend its facility to bend them to its 
interests. 
                                                            
519 Susanne Lohmann, Sollbruchstelle: Deep Uncertainty and the Design 
of Monetary Institutions, 3 INT’L FIN. 391 (2000) (applying the German 
engineering precept of sollbruchstelle to argue that institutions must be designed 
to accommodate evolving conditions and to themselves be adaptable in the face 
of changing circumstances). 
520 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional 
Partners: Improving the Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental 
Networks, 22 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing as an example the 
Financial Action Task Force). 
521 See generally B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal 
Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 INT’L 
ORG. 829 (2001). 
522 Id. 
523 Joseph Fewsmith, The Challenges of Stability and Legitimacy, in 
CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING 92, 111 (Robert S. Ross & Jo Inge Bekkevold 
eds., 2016). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Paper has argued that the PRC’s high degree of legal 
flexibility exists due to the factors suggested in prior works, but also 
for another fundamental reason.  The CCP’s reformers gleaned a 
crucial insight from their historical context when they realized that 
China’s previous rulers had failed in large part because they were 
unskilled in institutional entrepreneurship—the ability to create, 
maintain, modify and destroy institutions as needed.  Following 
Mao’s reign, the reformers acknowledged that investment-driven 
development was necessary for China, and with it, formal legal 
institutions—which meant that for the Party to remain securely in 
power, it had to institutionalize its role as China’s preeminent 
institutional entrepreneur.  But this needed to be accomplished 
without strongly committing the Party to particular policy paths, and 
at the same time, the Party would have to avoid being perceived as 
indifferent to the ‘commitments’ that can be read in its laws.  Above 
all, the Party would have to allow potential rival institutional 
entrepreneurs to exist and even to contribute to the development of 
China’s laws—but without losing ultimate authority over the 
country’s legal landscape. 
 The answer was to design a system of flexible formal 
legality.  The CCP relies upon economic growth in the maintenance 
of its legitimacy, but growth capable of destabilizing its rule would 
be as undesirable as no growth at all from the Party’s perspective.  
Accordingly, the economic suboptimalities inherent in China’s 
flexible laws are not the paradox they appear to be.  Myriad tensions 
remain within the PRC legal system, but its overriding goals—
growth bounded by the CCP’s ongoing control—mean that Western 
businesspeople and attorneys must modify the lens through which 
they view China’s law and history.  The PRC’s flexible legal system 
ensures that private interests can contribute to the country’s 
institutional evolution—but always along paths that the Party deems 
acceptable.  China’s flexible legal institutions thus serve the Party’s 
strategic interests, of which economic development, while 
important, is made to reinforce the CCP’s ongoing rule.  These 
conclusions suggest that the LAS scholarship must account for the 
state’s use of law in the formulation of its own competitive 
advantages. 
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 Finally, MNCs doing business in China should also make 
strategic use of these flexibilities by approaching the law 
entrepreneurially. While this idea has been suggested conceptually 
and in a general way,524 empirical research is needed to better 
understand whether (and how) firms strategically engage with 
China’s legal flexibilities.  The historical context and institutional 
nature of China’s flexible law discussed here can be harnessed in the 
strategies of individual companies doing business in China today.525  
The ambiguities of Chinese law in past eras, when law was perhaps 
not nearly as ambiguous, were known to stimulate creative 
discussion.526  The flexibility of modern PRC law supplies a 
conducive context for firms to embrace the law’s full strategic 
potential. It remains to be seen how this could—or should—work in 
practice.  This is not to say that legal uncertainties are entirely 
positive. To be sure, the PRC legal environment carries risks for the 
firm.  But these risks must be understood in conjunction with 
opportunity, and the firm’s cognizance of the history of China’s 
legal flexibility will empower it to embrace legal uncertainty not 
only as a risk, but also as a strategic opportunity.  Indeed, it is 
precisely because China’s legal flexibility often complicates 
predictions concerning the permissibility of one’s potential actions 
that having a thorough understanding of Chinese law in historical 
context is an asset for the MNC.  
 
                                                            
524 See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3. 
525 “Legal history is, can, and should be a mode of analysis to help us to 
understand not just the past on its own terms, but the present and future on our 
terms as well.” Roman J. Hoyos, Legal History as Political Thought, 56 AM. J. 
LEGAL HIST. 76, 76 (2016). See also Alfred L. Brophy, Introducing Applied Legal 
History, 31 LAW & HIST. REV. 233, 233–34 (2013) (defining applied legal history 
as “deeply researched, serious scholarship that is motivated by, engages with, or 
speaks to contemporary issues”). 
526 See, e.g., Michael Dalby, Revenge and the Law in Traditional China, 
25 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 267, 270 n.5 (1981) (discussing the sanction of revenge in 
ancient Chinese texts and observing that while these texts were ambiguous, they 
stimulated, rather than stifled, “creative discussion” on the legal permissibility of 
revenge as a social practice). Of course, as was noted above, ambiguities in law 
can also cause problems for regulated parties. Hence, the firm’s ability to cope 
effectively with uncertainty and ambiguity in the law is a crucial asset in one’s 
non-market strategy. See generally Evans & Gabel, supra note 3. 
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